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Introduction: The Proliferation Problem in the 1960s and 1970s 
Luxembourg is next to go, 
And (who knows?) maybe Monaco. 
We’ll all try to remain serene and calm 
When Alabama gets the bomb. 
Who’s next, who’s next, who’s next… 
Who’s next? 
 
—Tom Lehrer, "Who’s Next?" (1965) 
 
 The spread of nuclear weapons is a political phenomenon that has captivated post-Cold 
War presidents and the American public. From Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s 
fears that the "smoking gun" of the purported Iraqi nuclear weapons program would be a 
"mushroom cloud" to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s red line at the United 
Nations to the posturing of North Korea, fears of nuclear proliferation have prominently driven 
American foreign policy. President Barack Obama, speaking before Congress in his 2013 State 
of the Union Address, declared that "America will continue to lead the effort to prevent the 
spread of the world’s most dangerous weapons."1 
 By its very nature, proliferation is not just limited to the building of an explosive device, 
but also the spread of technical know-how. It is also self-sustaining. When India made signs of 
pursuing a nuclear test, Pakistan’s premier, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, declared in 1972 that his 
countrymen would "eat grass" if it meant the acquisition of a nuclear device.
2
 One scientist 
working on the Pakistani weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, brought his knowledge to the 
autocratic regimes of North Korea, Libya, and Iran. The consequences of the phenomenon’s 
early phases of proliferation have a direct effect on contemporary international politics. 
                                                 
1
 Quoted in “Analyzing President Obama’s State of the Union Address,” New York Times, 13 February 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/02/12/us/politics/obama-state-of-the-union-
2013.html?_r=0#/?annotation=280e1219d (Accessed 25 April 2013). 
2
 Quoted in Quoted in Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, New Nukes: India, Pakistan and Global Nuclear 
Disarmament, (New York: Olive Branch Press, 2000), 189. 
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 As will be discussed in the following chapter, the first two Presidents to possess the 
nuclear option following the Second World War valued the military and civilian applications of 
atomic energy too much in order to seek any sort of international limitations on its potential. 
However, the generation of Democratic politicians that succeeded Truman and Eisenhower were 
worried by the rapid expansion of the nuclear club to Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and 
France, with Communist China applying for membership. President John F. Kennedy used the 
issue of proliferation while still a senator to attack the Eisenhower administration. As President, 
Kennedy sought to stem the flow of nuclear arms on a case-by-case basis while seeking 
international controls on the testing of atomic explosives. Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon B. 
Johnson, entered office during a time when the world seemed to become more dangerous by the 
minute. As international historian Francis J. Gavin notes, "a nuclear armed China under Mao 
Zedong was far more terrifying [to American policymakers] than anything Iraq’s Saddam 
Hussein or current ‘rogue’ rulers could muster."3 
 Johnson, unlike Kennedy, did not have the time or political breathing room to pursue 
personal guarantees from the dissembling leaders of potential proliferators. He sought to craft an 
international settlement that would bypass the give-and-take of bilateral negotiations and put 
effective safeguards on civilian nuclear technology into place. However, crafting a treaty that 
was acceptable to existing nuclear powers and non-nuclear states proved to be difficult. Getting 
allies, like Israel, and important non-aligned states, like India, to ratify the 1968 Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or accept international inspections proved impossible. However, for 
the sake of this Treaty, Johnson was willing to undermine Kennedy’s bilateral efforts, or at least 
                                                 
3
 Francis Gavin, “Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s,” in International Security 29, no. 3 
(Winter 2004/2005), 100-101. 
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the ones he knew about, with the most immediate of proliferation dangers, Israel and India. The 
former acquired weapons on Johnson’s watch. The latter would do so under Nixon. 
 Richard M. Nixon was not concerned about proliferation in the same way as Kennedy 
and Johnson. As Vice President, he watched Johnson attack Eisenhower from the Senate for his 
inaction on the proliferation issue. As a candidate for the Presidency in 1960, he sweated under 
television lights as Kennedy sought to tie his record to Communist China’s weapons program. 
When he was President, nuclear proliferation did not make the international political landscape 
more threatening—it simply altered its topography. As will be seen in the cases of Israel and 
India, Nixon and his inner circle merely adjusted to the introduction of nuclear arms into the 
Middle East and South Asia after the fact, rather than take any sort of preventative measures. He 
signed the NPT for the sake of appearances, but had no intention of letting it become a constraint 
on his absolute freedom to conduct American foreign policy. 
 The second phase of nuclear proliferation—that by non-Security Council countries in the 
1960s and 1970s—acted as the impetus for weapons development by regimes in South Asia and 
the Middle East that proved to be problematic for later presidents. Non-proliferation policy in 
that time period seems at first glance to be a series of increasingly focused international 
negotiations culminating in the NPT, though the word "policy" implies a much more unified 
approach than was the case.  
 However, through analysis of declassified primary source material, a number of 
significant influences on American non-proliferation initiatives can be discerned. The following 
study examine these influences, including  presidential attitudes toward the spread of nuclear 
arms, the role of advisors, intelligence analysis, and the individual President’s way of conducting 
international relations. These competing factors all weighed on the minds of Kennedy, Johnson, 
[4] 
 
and Nixon when they confronted the spread of nuclear weapons and allowed two seemingly 
contradictory sets of policies to emerge. 
 
Historiographical Review 
 
 There are very few international historians who focus on both bilateral and multilateral 
American efforts to stymie the horizontal flow of nuclear arms. George H.W. Bush official and 
historian of non-proliferation Henry D. Sokolski’s historical analysis emphasized on what he 
described as "key nonproliferation initiatives," which were multilateral efforts such as the Baruch 
Plan, the Atoms for Peace Program, and the NPT.
4
 The purpose of his book was to examine 
"nonproliferation’s past and future" for the sake of contemporary policy. The link between the 
history of proliferation and advocacy is present in another survey of international non-
proliferation efforts—Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons — written by 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s former non-proliferation director, Joseph 
Cirincione.
5
 This book also analyzed the Baruch Plan, Atoms for Peace, and the NPT. To 
Cirincione, the significance of horizontal proliferators is after the fact—the policies they inspired 
and the threat to American interests they represented. Both of these texts are in favor of 
increased international controls on nuclear weapons. Sokolski’s historical analysis of non-
proliferation led him to urge American policymakers to distinguish between liberal and illiberal 
regimes when placing controls on civilian atomic energy—in order to "ensure that the next [non-
proliferation] campaign is the last."
6
  Cirincione’s account ended with the wish that "we may 
                                                 
4
 Henry D. Sokolski, Best of Intentions: America's Campaign against Strategic Weapons Proliferation (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 2001), xiii. 
5
 Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2007). 
6
 Sokolski, Best of Intentions, 111. 
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finally be able to correct the one mistake Einstein thought he made."
7
 Although Sokolski and 
Cirincione provide excellent narratives of the development of non-proliferation initiatives, their 
advocacy of a stricter international regulatory regime raises the question of bias in their analysis. 
 There are a number of excellent surveys on American nuclear relations with specific 
proliferating countries. The best examples of historical writing for specific cases discussed 
below, those of Israel and India, use extensive documentary research to produce a compelling 
account of American diplomatic initiatives to check the spread of nuclear weapons. Avner 
Cohen’s Israel and the Bomb is supported by many primary sources declassified at the author’s 
behest, but multilateral US efforts garner only cursory examination as external influences on the 
Israeli program.
8
 This account is focused on elucidating the compromises between American and 
Israeli policymakers. For example, the NPT is featured as a sticking point in US-Israel relations, 
rather than a topic of separate inquiry. After India’s Pokhran II nuclear tests of May 1998, 
George Perkovich, a social scientist by training, wrote a history of India’s nuclear program—
which was tied very closely to relations with the United States— using both American and 
Indian sources.
9
 Again, the interplay between multilateral agreements and American policy 
toward the potential proliferator is minimal; the NPT is again portrayed as a simple diplomatic 
complication. 
 The study below seeks to examine both broad and country-specific American non-
proliferation initiatives. When bilateral negotiations with Israel and India in the 1960s and 1970s 
are compared with formal American international non-proliferation policy during that time 
period, an apparent contradiction is discovered. As Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon 
                                                 
7
 Cirincione, Bomb Scare, 157. 
8
 Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 
9
 George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1999). 
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were overtly working to place increasingly strict safeguards on the civilian nuclear programs of 
those nations, they were privately undermining their own efforts through a series of oversights 
and willful compromises. 
 The following account seeks to explain how American presidents and policymakers could 
hold in their minds two diametrically opposed sets of motivations and plans. Through the 
analysis of declassified primary source material, it is possible to reconstruct policymaker 
perceptions of the "Nth power problem," as international relations theorist Albert Wohlstetter 
described nuclear proliferation in his influential 1961 article in Foreign Affairs.
10
 The decision-
making processes thus reproduced help explain how the key American officials could support 
bilateral policies which undermined their own broad non-proliferation efforts. 
  
                                                 
10
 Albert Wohlstetter, “Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Country,” in Foreign Affairs 3, no.4 (April 1961): 355-
387. 
[7] 
 
A Patchwork Policy: Formal Non-Proliferation Efforts from Truman to Nixon 
It will be very difficult to persuade the world that a nation which was capable of secretly 
preparing and suddenly releasing a weapon, as indiscriminate as the rocket bomb and a 
thousand times more destructive, is to be trusted in its proclaimed desire of having such weapons 
abolished by international agreement. 
 
— "Report of the Committee on Political and Social Problems",  
Manhattan Project Metallurgical Laboratory (11 June 1945)
11
 
 
 After the shocking debut of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, the White 
House released a statement explaining this scientific development to American and foreign 
audiences.
12
  While most of the statement is devoted to the Manhattan Project, the technical 
capabilities of the device, and its implications for the war against Japan, two short paragraphs at 
predicted the perils of nuclear proliferation: 
It has never been the habit of the scientists of this country or the policy of this 
Government to withhold from the world scientific knowledge. Normally, 
therefore, everything about the work with atomic energy would be made public. 
 But under present circumstances it is not intended to divulge the technical 
processes of production or all the military applications, pending further 
examination of possible methods of protecting us from the rest of the world from 
the danger of sudden destruction.
13
 
 
The United States developed a weapon of significant destructive capabilities in secret and 
opened Pandora's Box to reveal a mushroom cloud. As noted in the statement, the spread of 
nuclear weapons to other countries was perceived by Truman to be directly against the strategic 
interests of the United States. Truman also recognized the political difficulty of denying other 
nations the potential civilian applications of nuclear technology. However, his position as a 
wartime president led him to maximize the relatively short-term military benefit of the bomb 
                                                 
11
 "Report of the Committee on Political and Social Problems, Manhattan Project Metallurgical Laboratory, 
University of Chicago, 11 June 1945, U.S. National Archives, Washington D.C.: Record Group 77, Manhattan 
Engineer District Records, Harrison-Bundy File, folder #76. 
12
 Cited in Robert C. Williams and Philip L. Cantelon, eds., The American Atom: A Documentary History of Nuclear 
Policies from the Discovery of Fission to the Present, 1939-1984 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1984),  68-70. 
13
 Williams and Cantelon, eds., The American Atom, 70. 
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through its use instead of catering to long-term political and diplomatic consequences. The moral 
and political imperatives of the Second World War seemed to predominate within the Truman 
White House’s nuclear policy long after the capitulation of the Axis powers. 
 The scientists involved with the Manhattan Project, realizing that nuclear weaponry 
would dramatically alter the geopolitical balance of the world and the stakes of war, repeatedly 
urged the Truman administration to strive for international regulation of the atom. Earlier in June 
of 1945, a group known as the Panel of Scientists reported to the Interim Committee, Truman’s 
top-secret advisory body on nuclear power. The members of the Panel were key scientists who 
developed atomic weaponry and included Arthur H. Compton, Ernest O. Lawrence, J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, and Enrico Fermi.
14
  
 In their report, the scientists expressed their hope that the use of an atomic bomb would 
"promote a satisfactory adjustment of our international relations," while noting the "obligation to 
our nation to use the weapons to help save American lives in the Japanese war."
15
 This roughly 
matches up with Truman’s views: there were political incentives for the regulation of nuclear 
technology, but after the international threat had passed. However, the scientists went further. 
Drawing on their earlier wishes for an "adjustment of our international relations," they suggested 
that: 
…before the weapons are used, not only Britain, but also Russia, France, and 
China be advised that we have made considerable progress in our work on atomic 
weapons and these may be ready to use during the present war, and that we would 
welcome suggestions as to how we can cooperate in making this development 
contribute to improved international relations.
16
 
 
                                                 
14
Cited in Williams and Cantelon, eds., The American Atom, 63-64. 
15
 Cited in Williams and Cantelon, eds. The American Atom, 63. 
16
 Cited in Williams and Cantelon, eds. The American Atom, 63. All four of the aforementioned nations developed 
nuclear arms by 1964. 
[9] 
 
Ten days later, on 26 June 1945, George L. Harrison, assistant to Secretary of War Henry L. 
Stimson on nuclear matters, noted that a large number of Manhattan Project scientists, via 
anonymously submitted comments:  
… [felt] great concern for the future if atomic power is not controlled through 
some effective international mechanism. Accordingly, most of them believe that 
one of the effective steps in establishing such a control is the assurance that, after 
this war is over, there shall be a free interchange of scientific opinion throughout 
the world supplemented, if possible, by some system of inspection. This they 
admit is a problem of the future.
17
 
 
This sentiment was echoed by a group of Manhattan Project scientists, headed by Leo Szilard, 
working out of the secret "Metallurgical Laboratory" at the University of Chicago in a petition to 
Truman on 17 July 1945. In this petition, they expressed the fear that American use of an atomic 
weapon would lead to an international arms race. Citing the threat of "sudden annihilation," the 
Chicago scientists urged Truman to consider that: 
…the material strength that this lead gives the United States brings with it the 
obligation of restraint and if we were to violate this obligation our moral position 
would be weakened in the eyes of the world and in our own eyes. It would then be 
more difficult for us to live up to our responsibility of bringing the unloosened 
forces of destruction under control.
18
 
 
The Manhattan Project scientists consistently pushed the administration to view atomic 
weaponry as a political and moral development, not just as a new military technology. 
 Truman chose to not act on their advice and ordered the dropping of atomic bomb on 
Japan without warning. He agreed that nuclear weapons ought to be regulated, but continued to 
place military considerations before diplomatic initiatives. In a memo to Truman, Stimson 
argued that "civilization demands that some day we shall arrive at a satisfactory international 
arrangement respecting the control of this new force, the question then is how long we can afford 
to enjoy our momentary superiority in the hope of achieving our immediate peace council 
                                                 
17
 Cited in Williams and Cantelon, eds. The American Atom, 65. 
18
 Cited in Williams and Cantelon, eds. The American Atom, 67. 
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objectives."
19
 However, there was much disagreement as to who should control atomic secrets: 
the military or civilian leadership. Truman backed the May-Johnson Bill, which would have 
created an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) within the Department of Defense and classified 
most nuclear information, but organized scientific opposition stalled the bill in the Senate.
20
 
 Brien McMahon, a Democratic senator from Connecticut and chairman of the Senate 
Special Committee on Atomic Energy, sponsored a new bill proposing civilian control of nuclear 
power. The bill, which passed unanimously in the Senate, established a government monopoly 
on atomic energy via a five-man and non-military AEC. 
21
 It also criminalized unauthorized 
dissemination of nuclear technology or materials with a penalty of up to $10,000 and five years 
in prison.
22
 This measure was reported to have nearly universal public support, which Anthony 
Leviero, writing for the New York Times attributed to the unanimity of the Senate Special 
Committee on Atomic Energy.
23
 However, the AEC's tight control over atomic secrets alienated 
wartime allies Canada and the United Kingdom, whom Franklin D. Roosevelt had promised 
cooperation on nuclear matters.
24
 This led Clement Atlee to inform W. Averell Harriman, 
Truman's Ambassador to the Court of St. James, that the McMahon bill compelled Britain to 
"build her own plants for atomic energy production for both military and civilian purposes."
25
 
This was the first of many instances of a non-nuclear country initiating a development program 
in direct reaction to exclusion from the "nuclear club." 
                                                 
19
 Cited in Williams and Cantelon, eds. The American Atom, 76. 
20
 Williams and Cantelon, eds. The American Atom, 71. 
21
 Anthony Leviero, "Senate Body Votes M'Mahon Atom Bill without Dissent,"  New York Times, 12 April 1946, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/107400869?accountid=12010 (Accessed 17 February 2013). 
22
 Cited in Williams and Cantelon, eds. The American Atom, 90. 
23
 Leviero, "Senate Body Votes," http://search.proquest.com/docview/107400869?accountid=12010. 
24
 Raymond Dawson and Richard Rosecrance, “Theory and Reality in the Anglo-American Alliance," World 
Politics 19, no.1 (October 1966): 21-51. 
25
 Cited in H.G. Nicholas, Britain and the United States (London: Chatto and Windus, 1963), 64. 
[11] 
 
 The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 created a domestic regulatory regime for nuclear power 
with some international consequences. It seems that Truman learned from British and Canadian 
backlash to the Act. In his memoirs, he states that he conferred with Secretary of State James F. 
Byrnes on the importance of being "in a position where we could put our plan for international 
control before the United Nations without being handicapped by a domestic law that would have 
made it impossible for us to participate."
26
 Truman assembled a panel of scientists, military 
officials, corporate executives, and diplomats to write a report on the prospects of international 
regulation. It took its name from  its most prominent authors: Undersecretary of State Dean 
Acheson and David E. Lilienthal, chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
27
 The Acheson-
Lilienthal Report noted that the board was: 
…impressed by the great advantages of an international agency with affirmative 
powers and functions coupled with powers of inspection and supervision in 
contrast to any agency with merely police-like powers attempting to cope with 
national agencies otherwise restrained only by a commitment to "outlaw" the use 
of atomic energy for war.
28
 
 
The unauthorized release of this report brought the attention of the press and gave Truman's 
nominated representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC), 
respected Democratic financier Bernard Baruch cold feet about the position.
29
 Baruch explained 
in a letter to the President that he was uncomfortable with the forming public understanding that 
his purview would include policy formulation as well as representing US interests at the 
UNAEC.
30
 Byrnes assured his fellow South Carolinian that he would continue to be "adviser to 
Presidents," but politely reminded him that he would act in a capacity of Truman's choosing.
31
 
                                                 
26
 Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1956), 2:7. 
27
 Both would be promoted shortly thereafter; Acheson to Secretary of State and Lilienthal to chairman of the AEC. 
28
 Board of Consultants to the Secretary of State's Commission on Atomic Energy, “A Report on the International 
Control of Atomic Energy,” Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., March 16, 1946. 
29
 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 2:9. 
30
 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 2:8. 
31
 Quoted in Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 2:10. 
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Baruch accepted the nomination and set to work on converting the Acheson-Lilienthal Report 
into a proposal for international consideration. 
 Truman sent Baruch instructions on 7 June 1946 to advocate for international regulation 
of nuclear power including "managerial control of all atomic energy activities intrinsically 
dangerous to world security" and inspection powers.
32
 The Baruch Plan, as it came to be known, 
was bold and proposed that that national atomic programs had to be "subordinate to the direction 
and absolute dominion on the part of the international authority."
33
 Baruch brought the proposal 
before the UNAEC on 14 June and within hours encountered sharp opposition from the Soviet 
Union. The Soviets, as well as the Polish delegation, wanted unilateral American nuclear 
disarmament, an immediate cessation of atomic bomb production, and a non-use agreement 
before they would accept the agreement.
34
 Truman told Baruch that he did not want to "throw 
away our gun until we are sure the rest of the world can't arm against us."
35
 The UNAEC 
approved a plan similar to that proposed by Baruch, but it was indefinitely blocked in the 
Security Council by the Soviet veto. Baruch, who described international control as "the last, 
best hope of earth," became disheartened in the face of Soviet obstructionism and resigned in 
1947.
36
 The stalemate in the UN and rapidly degrading relations with the Soviet Union at the 
beginning of the Cold War frustrated Truman, who gave up on international regulation of atomic 
energy. He ended the section of his memoirs devoted to the Baruch Plan by writing: "The 
possibility that Russia would not co-operate in an international control scheme had been 
anticipated by us. We were prepared, in any event, to safeguard our own national interest."
37
 The 
                                                 
32
 Williams and Cantelon, eds. The American Atom, 94. 
33
 Williams and Cantelon, eds. The American Atom, 97. 
34
 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 2:11. 
35
 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 2:11. 
36
 Williams and Cantelon, eds. The American Atom, 72. 
37
 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 2:11. 
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failure of the Truman administration to reach any sort of international settlement on the nuclear 
proliferation question can be attributed to the same conundrum presented in his Hiroshima 
statement: how to maintain the military advantage of a nuclear monopoly while convincing other 
countries to forgo weapons development. 
 The banner of international nuclear regulation was not raised again until almost one year 
into Dwight D. Eisenhower's first administration. On 11 January 1952, the United Nations 
General Assembly adopted resolution 02 (VI): "Regulations, Limitation, and Balanced 
Reduction of All Armed Forces and All Armaments; International Control of Atomic Energy" 
under joint British, French, and American sponsorship.
38
 This resolution established a 
Disarmament Commission under Security Council purview.
39
 Eisenhower's response came in an 
8 December 1953 address before the General Assembly, in which he noted that "the knowledge 
now possessed by several nations [the US, Great Britain, Canada, and the Soviet Union] will 
eventually be shared by others, possibly all others" and that "even a vast superiority in numbers 
of weapons... is no preventive, of itself, against the fearful damage and toll of human lives that 
would be inflicted by surprise aggression."
40
 He proposed using "Atoms for Peace" by 
supporting international civilian nuclear development. The United States, he claimed, would be 
"proud" to show "all the peoples of all nations...  that, in this enlightened age, the great powers of 
the earth, both of the East and of the West, are interested in human aspirations first rather than 
building up the armaments of war."
41
 By stockpiling fissionable material with the UN's 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the US could prevent vertical proliferation, or 
                                                 
38
 US Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Editorial Note," in Foreign Relations of the United States 
(FRUS), 1952-1954, 2:845. 
39
 UN General Assembly, Sixth Session, "Resolution 502 VI (1951) [On International Control of Atomic Energy], 
Adopted 11 January 1952, in FRUS, 1951, 1:613-615. 
40
 Williams and Cantelon, eds. The American Atom, 106. 
41
 Williams and Cantelon, eds. The American Atom, 111. 
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increased weapon quantity and quality in existing nuclear nations. This plan was based on the 
assumption in the US national security establishment that the Soviet Union would have two 
hundred atomic bombs by 1954, which was enough to destroy the American economy "beyond 
recovery."
42
 If the fissionable materials necessary for extensive weapons production were 
impounded, stored, and monitored by international agreement, no nuclear power could have the 
weapons capacity for a knockout blow to an opponent's economy. 
 While the Atoms for Peace program sought to combat vertical proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, it facilitated the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. Eisenhower's 
proposed allocation of fissionable material to non-nuclear countries for the "needs of agriculture, 
medicine and other peaceful activities," particularly electricity for the "power-starved areas of 
the world," likely made weapons development possible for those countries.
43
 The administration 
was well-aware that Atoms for Peace could facilitate nuclear proliferation; indeed, it was not 
considered a significant threat to American interests. Eisenhower's Ambassador to the UN for 
disarmament issues, Harold Stassen, explaining the "substance" of the program, noted that even 
with the most effective international controls, "it would be perfectly possible... for some... future 
government... to take away and divert without the knowledge of the inspectors, a quantity of 
fissionable material from which twenty, forty, or even fifty multi-megaton bombs could be 
fabricated." However, according to Stassen, this was not a problem because as: 
long as there does exist on various sides in the world a remaining nuclear 
weapons capability, there would not be the incentive for relatively minor 
diversion into unauthorized weapons. Nor would there be the terrible 
consequences if there were relatively minor diversion for a few weapons; because 
those few weapons would be restrained, canceled out and deterred by the 
remaining capability in the hands of nations on various sides.
44
 
                                                 
42
Sokolski, Best of Intentions, 26. 
43
 Williams and Cantelon, eds. The American Atom, 110. 
44
 "Statement by the United States Representative (Stassen) to the Disarmament Subcommittee: Nuclear Weapons 
and Testing, 20 March 1957," in U.S. Department of State, Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959, 2:765-768. 
[15] 
 
 
The conclusion that some horizontal proliferation of nuclear arms was an acceptable cost of 
superpower arms reductions seems counter-intuitive. However, as discussed above, American 
policymakers were concerned with preventing a "knockout blow" to the economy; a true threat 
was a nuclear arsenal greater than the golden count of two hundred bombs. A country with a 
smaller arsenal could be deterred in the usual manner without ever seriously having the capacity 
to significantly endanger the United States. As such, the US Congress amended the Atomic 
Energy Act in 1958 to allow exports of fissile material, technical designs, and parts, even if the 
recipients "made significant progress in the development of nuclear weapons."
45
 
 This all changed when American nuclear strategists began to realize that the strategic 
balance was much more precarious than previously thought. Robert C. Sprague, an electric 
company executive and consultant to the National Security Council (NSC), told Eisenhower on 7 
November 1957 that a mere two hundred and forty Soviet planes could knock out the airfields 
and aircraft carriers necessary for a retaliatory nuclear strike before American planes could 
scramble.
46
 Sprague was director of a group of private citizens known as "The Security 
Resources Panel of the Office of Defense Mobilization Science Advisory Committee," which 
was responsible for assessing Soviet strength and American weakness.
47
 Eisenhower rejected the 
Panel's findings because he thought they underestimated the value of overseas Strategic Air 
Command (SAC) bases and did not understand the "totality" of the American strategic situation, 
particularly the importance of appearing strong to allies.
48
 Sprague thought that his meeting with 
the President was a waste of time and to some extent, he was correct. Eisenhower "disdained 
hype" and thought it very unlikely that SAC would be so caught by surprise that they would be 
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unable to retaliate in significant numbers.
49
 However, even if Eisenhower and his Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles found the Panel's findings unconvincing, senior Democrats did not. 
Texas Senator Lyndon B. Johnson pressed the administration to release the Panel's report, known 
as the "Gaither Report" to the public, albeit with redactions of classified information.
50
 The New 
York Times also helped fan public concern and pressured Eisenhower to release the report, 
writing that the previous understandings of American strategic superiority were: 
...a fool's paradise, and it is past time to come out of it. The truth is one of the 
tonics we need, and if the Gaither report tells us some harsh truths it is all the 
more important to proclaim them. The American people are going to be called 
upon to make some sacrifices to preserve their freedoms, but they must know why 
this is necessary. It is time for strong medicine, not a soothing pap.
51
 
 
Although Eisenhower considered the public pressure over the report to be "a gadfly," it helped 
challenge the administration's focus on vertical proliferation and strengthened voices against the 
reasoning behind the Atoms for Peace program within the administration.
52
 One such voice, 
Ambassador to the UN Henry Cabot Lodge, admitted that a single nuclear weapon could "easily 
ignite a nuclear conflagration" and that IAEA safeguards were not enough to prevent horizontal 
proliferation.
53
 After France tested a nuclear device in February 1960, a National Intelligence 
Estimate (NIE) determined that "Communist China" likely started a weapons development 
program and that West Germany, Sweden, India, and Japan had the capacity to begin 
development.
54
 The intelligence community, unlike Eisenhower, argued via the estimate that 
horizontal proliferation was a threat to American interests, as "any increase in the number of 
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nuclear powers could raise the chances that nuclear weapons would be used. It would also 
increase the dangers which could flow from actions taken through miscalculation."
55
 
 Non-proliferation also gave the Democrats a stick with which to beat the Eisenhower 
administration and its designated successor, 1960 presidential nominee Richard M. Nixon. John 
F. Kennedy, riding a new wave of public outcry over a perceived "missile gap," attacked Nixon 
in the third televised debate with the linked charge of being complacent toward proliferation, 
stating:  
There are indications, because of new inventions, that ten, fifteen, or twenty 
nations will have a nuclear capacity—including Red China—by the end of the 
presidential office in 1964. This is extremely serious. . . I think the fate not only 
of our own civilization, but I think the fate of world and the future of the human 
race, is involved in preventing a nuclear war.
56
 
 
The Kennedy administration would prove to be one of the most attentive toward the spread of 
nuclear weapons, due in no small part to Kennedy himself. Israeli historian and nuclear weapons 
scholar Avner Cohen, citing numerous interviews with administration officials, asserts that "no 
American president was more concerned with the danger of nuclear proliferation."
57
 In his first 
State of the Union address on 30 January 1961, Kennedy asserted that "the deadly arms race, and 
the huge resources it absorbs, have too long overshadowed all else we must do. We must prevent 
the arms race from spreading to new nations, to new nuclear powers and to the reaches of outer 
space."
58
 Robert S. McNamara, the new Secretary of Defense, joined a chorus of voice who rode 
the wave of public insecurity over the balance of nuclear power into the Kennedy White House. 
A few months before the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, McNamara argued against the 
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Eisenhower administration’s assumption that no rational individual would start against a nuclear 
war, stating: 
…the mere fact that no nation could rationally take steps leading to a nuclear war 
does not guarantee that a nuclear war cannot take place. Not only do nations 
sometimes act in ways that are hard to explain on a rational basis, but even when 
acting in a "rational" way, they sometimes, indeed disturbingly often, act on the 
basis of misunderstandings of the true facts of a situation. They misjudge the 
ways others will react and the way others will interpret what they are doing.
59
 
 
This attitude toward nuclear weapons raised the public profile of horizontal weapons 
proliferation as a security threat to the United States. 
 The military establishment partially concurred, but Lyman Lemnitzer, Kennedy’s 
inherited Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), authored a memo arguing that the US 
should not support UN Resolution 1576 (XV), known as the "Irish Resolution," which would 
have restricted the transfer of nuclear weapons between states, including American allies in 
NATO.
60
 William C. Foster, Arms Control and Disarmament ACDA director, on the other hand, 
argued in favor of some form of an international non-transfer agreement on 26 July 1962.
61
 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk backed the idea of a non-transfer agreement as well.
62
 However, 
the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 torpedoed any chance of reaching a multilateral 
agreement with the Soviet Union on the dissemination of weapons-grade fissionable material and 
technology. 
 Indeed, at first glance it is very difficult for a historian to produce evidence of any formal 
policy on non-proliferation within the Kennedy administration. However, this is not to say that 
Kennedy’s record shows a lack of seriousness on proliferation issues. As noted above, he 
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considered the spread of nuclear weapons to be a dire threat to global stability. He attacked 
Nixon in the 1960 campaign by painting the Eisenhower administration as inattentive to the point 
of negligence. Kennedy made non-proliferation a key goal in American policy toward Israel, 
even at the expense of felicitous bilateral relations. 
 Although it is speculation to ask why the Kennedy administration did not produce a 
formal non-transfer agreement, the findings of the intelligence community seem to downplay the 
likelihood of proliferation. NIE 4-3-61 noted that France would likely continue with its weapons 
development program and that Israel "had strong incentives" to start a program.
63
 In addition to 
these specific examples of proliferation risks, the estimate determined that the costs of weapons 
development were dropping in 1961, as Uranium-235, bomb design, reactors, and specialists 
became more available. Despite this alarming trend, the intelligence community thought that 
Kennedy's campaign claim that " ten, fifteen, or twenty nations will have a nuclear capacity... by 
the end of the presidential office in 1964" was unlikely. The estimate concluded that: 
...the inhibitions on deciding to start a weapons program are formidable. At the 
present state of the art, the most limited weapons system program would cost in 
the hundreds of million dollars and a moderate program of sophisticated weapons 
and delivery systems would run into the billions. We estimate that over the next 
several years there will be no technological breakthrough which would 
significantly alter the complexity and cost of these tasks.
64
 
 
As will be discussed below, Kennedy devoted significant attention to the specific case of Israel 
and continued to raise the issue of nuclear inspections with Prime Ministers Ben-Gurion and 
Eshkol throughout his term of office. Beyond Israel, little attention was given to nuclear weapons 
development, because such a contingency was viewed as highly unlikely. 
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 The issue of non-dissemination rose again during negotiations surrounding a Limited 
Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). In the months following the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, 
Kennedy reached out to his Soviet counterpart, Chairman Nikita Khrushchev, via Undersecretary 
of State for Political Affairs and former New York Governor W. Averell Harriman. In a 26 April 
1963 conversation with the Chairman, Harriman suggested that the US and the Soviet Union 
attempt to draft a test ban treaty. Khrushchev reportedly replied "we'll sign one right away, but, 
with no espionage inspections, ever." Harriman, seeing an opening, attempted to draw a 
comparison between Soviet concerns over a West German nuclear bomb and American worries 
of a Chinese program to push for a non-proliferation agreement. Khrushchev asserted that the 
Chinese and German situations were not analogous, as Germany was a mutual enemy during the 
Second World War and China was a Soviet ally.
 65
 American hopes of linking non-proliferation 
to a test ban treaty were foiled by Cold War hostilities with the Soviet Union. 
 The Limited Test Ban Treaty did serve some non-proliferation goals. Article I called for 
the signatories to ban nuclear tests "in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; 
or under water, including territorial waters or high seas."
66
 It was initially signed by 
representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Of the countries 
detailed as potential proliferators in NIE 4-3-61, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, Japan, Canada, 
South Africa, and Australia all signed the Treaty by October of 1963. The notable exception was 
China. The New York Times praised the "history-making" Treaty on the date of  its ratification in 
the Senate (25 September 1963) as a "Victory for Peace."
67
 However, the Treaty ought to be 
viewed as a significant check to vertical proliferation and a minor restriction on the horizontal 
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spread of nuclear weapons. Israel developed nuclear weapons without a test of any variety. The 
LTBT did not prevent China in 1964 or India in 1974 from performing conventional ground-
based explosions. 
 Kennedy, speaking in favor of the Treaty at American University in June 1963, argued: 
It would place the nuclear powers in a position to deal more effectively with one 
of the greatest hazards which man faces in 1963, the further spread of nuclear 
arms. It would increase our security — it would decrease the prospects of war. 
Surely this goal is sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit, yielding 
neither to the temptation to give up the whole effort nor the temptation to give up 
our insistence on vital and responsible safeguards.
68
 
 
American non-proliferation initiatives were derailed by Kennedy's assassination on 22 
November 1963.  
 His successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, inherited many leading voices in the non-proliferation 
debate when he retained Kennedy's cabinet. Johnson, it should be noted, attacked the Eisenhower 
administration from the Senate over the Gaither Report in 1957 and viewed the spread of nuclear 
weapons to additional countries as a dire threat to American security. In his 1971 memoir, 
Johnson wrote: 
All I could do was to move as fast and as far as possible during my Presidency to 
slow the arms race, to achieve international agreements on their control, and to 
prevent the continuing proliferation of weapons that could mean the end of 
civilization as we knew it.
69
 
 
After the LTBT and Kennedy’s death, Rusk recalled a "lull" in arms control negotiations.70 
However, by January 1964, Johnson and his advisors redoubled their efforts to draft an effective 
international non-proliferation agreement. In his State of the Union address on 8 January, 
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Johnson pledged to make "new proposals at [the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference 
(ENDC) in] Geneva toward the control and the eventual abolition of arms."
71
 
 Johnson’s director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), William C. 
Foster, delivered a message from the President at Geneva on 21 January 1964. In this message, 
Johnson stated that the delegates could agree: 
 (a) that nuclear weapons not be transferred into the national control of 
states which do not now control them, and that all transfers of nuclear materials 
for peaceful purposes take place under effective international safeguards; 
 (b) that the major nuclear powers accept in an increasing number of their peaceful 
nuclear activities the same inspection they recommend for other states; and 
 (c) on the banning of all nuclear weapon tests under effective verification and 
control.
72
 
 
This sort of thinking was shared by Rusk and Foster, who also viewed the spread of atomic 
weapons as a destabilizing force in international politics, as it increased the risk of nuclear war 
and triggered arms races. As will be discussed in the case studies below, Kennedy favored 
cutting bilateral secret deals with the leaders of potential proliferators to stem the spread of 
nuclear weapons. By seeking a binding international settlement on non-proliferation, Johnson 
was proposing a change in tactics from those used by Kennedy. However, the sought multilateral 
safeguards drove countries like Israel and India to undermine the substance of the treaty. 
 Yet in 1964, the greatest proliferation threat was Communist China. Kennedy and his 
advisors had considered using force, possibly Nationalist Chinese commandos, to strike nuclear 
facilities on the mainland.
73
 However, Johnson and his advisors expected China to explode a 
nuclear device. Their concern, as revealed by Johnson’s memoirs, was what to do after China; 
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"how to deal with a great many nations, of all sizes and levels of political stability, equipped with 
nuclear weapons."
74
  
 Prior to the Chinese test, American policy had been occupied by the prospect of atomic 
weapons transfers from nuclear states to non-nuclear states. Negotiations with the Soviet Union 
on a non-proliferation agreement stalled over the US-backed Multilateral Force (MLF) 
proposals, which would have given NATO countries—including the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG)—some control over American nuclear weapons. Two White House officials, 
David Klein of the NSC and Steven R. Rivkin of the President’s Office of Science and 
Technology, argued in favor of changing the focus of US non-proliferation policy to independent 
weapons production by non-nuclear countries.
 75
 
 On a 16 June 1964 meeting of the Committee of Principals, the Kennedy-created 
interagency group devoted to arms control issues, Rusk noted in discussion of the anticipated 
Chinese test, that the United States in fact had no official non-proliferation policy.
76
 This remark 
started formal American international efforts to restrict the production of nuclear weapons by 
non-nuclear countries. Adrian S. Fisher, the Deputy Director of the ACDA was assigned 
responsibility for drafting a position paper. Although the ACDA would be the leading federal 
agency advocating strict non-proliferation controls, Rusk’s contribution was significant. As will 
be discussed in the specific cases below, the State Department often found non-proliferation 
controls to be a difficult subject to raise with allies, such as Israel, and influential neutral 
countries, such as India. Rusk consistently proved to be a strong advocate of non-proliferation 
throughout his term of office. 
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 ACDA Director Foster forwarded Fisher's draft position paper to Rusk on 14 August 
1964 titled "Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons."
77
 The draft paper was the first formal 
attempt by the American government to create a coherent non-proliferation policy. Foster’s 
paper began by asserting that the process of independent weapons development, once begun, was 
"maybe impossible to halt."
78
 Therefore, the task of the United States was to: 
…develop political inhibitions against the development of further national nuclear 
capabilities which are sufficiently strong to stand the shock of a Communist 
Chinese nuclear detonation. The problem which faces the United States is how to 
develop these political inhibitions against the development of further national 
nuclear capabilities within the limited period of time available to us.
79
 
 
Foster’s understanding of the problem marks the most activist side of the non-proliferation 
debate within the policy-making apparatuses of the US government. The reason for increased 
attention to non-proliferation is given by Foster shortly before delving into specific policy: 
If we do not solve this problem—either because of mistake or because of delay—
we will soon be faced with a world in which there are ten and then possibly 
twenty states having national nuclear capabilities. This would be a world of the 
greatest danger and insecurity.
80
 
 
These concerns were very similar to those of Kennedy and Johnson. To Foster, the phenomenon 
of nuclear proliferation was self-sustaining and destabilizing to the international order. 
 The draft paper proposed a range of bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Foster argued 
that "appropriate arguments, pressures, and inducements" ought to be brought on a number of 
countries with sophisticated domestic nuclear programs capable of developing weapons, namely, 
Israel, India, Sweden, Japan, and the FRG, with particular emphasis on the first two.
81
 As a 
preventative measure, he also advocated controls on the technical requirements necessary for 
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weapons development, such as rigorous inspection of plutonium stocks and an agreement among 
nuclear supplier nations to not sell to countries unwilling to accept safeguards.
82
 Finally, the 
United States was to seek an international non-proliferation agreement, instead of a bilateral 
agreement with the Soviet Union, albeit with Soviet support through dropping the divisive issue 
of nuclear transfers. Foster envisioned a series of strict safeguards on national nuclear energy 
programs monitored by the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).83 In total, these 
proposals would have formed a comprehensive non-proliferation regime. However, as noted in 
the cases below, the Johnson administration found that bilateral negotiations over the 
implementation of said safeguards were difficult, took time, and gave potential proliferators such 
as Israel and India breathing room for accelerated weapons development. 
 Some State Department officials took issue with some of the conclusions of Foster’s 
paper. Ambassador at Large and acting Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs 
Llewellyn E. Thompson argued that the Foster draft was a "substantial step forward," but argued 
that the broad, international approach to a non-proliferation agreement would make it difficult to 
gain the support of the Soviet Union, China, and European allies such as the FRG and Italy.
84
 
The State Department would regularly focus on the difficulty of compelling ostensible allies and 
neutral countries to accept safeguards. Rather than strain bilateral relations to the point of risking 
other policy priorities, Johnson and Nixon-era State Department officials continually advocated 
less strict stances on nuclear safeguards. 
 A week after the Chinese detonation on 16 October 1964, Johnson convened a group of 
government officials and private citizens called the "Committee on Nuclear Proliferation." This 
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group was commonly referred to as the "Gilpatric Committee" after its chairman, Wall Street 
lawyer and former Undersecretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric.
85
 The Gilpatric Committee 
issued a report for consumption by the President and apparently accepted Foster’s logic for a 
robust non-proliferation policy "unanimously," noting that: 
The spread of nuclear weapons poses an increasingly grave threat to the security 
of the United States. New nuclear capabilities, however primitive and regardless 
of whether they are held by nations currently friendly to the United States, will 
add complexity and instability to the deterrent balance between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, aggravate suspicions and hostility among states 
neighboring new nuclear powers, place a wasteful economic burden on the 
aspirations of developing nations, impede the vital task of controlling and 
reducing weapons around the world, and eventually constitute direct military 
threats to the United States.
86
 
 
The Gilpatric Committee offered a number of controversial recommendations, such as a full-
blown American effort to negotiate a non-proliferation treaty, the isolation of nuclear France, a 
push to induce Great Britain to give up its nuclear arsenal, increased cooperation with the Soviet 
Union on proliferation issues, and the exclusion of nuclear options from NATO decision-
making.
87
 Rusk considered the Gilpatric report "as explosive as a nuclear weapon" and attempted 
to keep out of the public eye.
88
 
 Johnson’s rival for the soul of the Democratic Party, Senator Robert F. Kennedy of New 
York, made his maiden speech in the upper chamber on the topic of nuclear proliferation, 
declaring that it was the "most vital issue now facing the nation and the world."
89
 He urged 
Johnson to make the drafting of a non-proliferation treaty a "central priority." This deeply 
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angered the President, especially because it seemed as if the Gilpatric report had been leaked to 
his rival. In a phone conversation with National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy on the day 
of Kennedy’s speech, Johnson growled that he had been informed by a friendly newspaperman 
that the Senator hoped to take an "independent posture" from the administration on the issue of 
non-proliferation.
90
 According to Johnson, Kennedy was trying to "find something that he could 
disagree [with the administration] on… [as] ‘a matter of principle.’" The next day, Johnson told 
Bundy that he did not "want to get into proliferation in any way so it looks like I’m 
copying…Bobby…" and Bundy agreed, noting that the "damned nuisance" of the whole affair 
was that "people will play it as if this was something he prodded us into."
91
 Kennedy stole 
Johnson’s thunder and the President initially scrapped the idea of pushing non-proliferation at a 
speech in San Francisco on the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the UN. Johnson called 
the editor of the Baltimore Sun later that day to deny that he ever planned the announcement of a 
treaty, saying that "some of the boys in… [the] UN or some of the former Kennedy lobbyists" 
were trying to push some ideas into the speech.
92
  
 However much Kennedy’s speech and behind-the-scenes politicking irked Johnson, non-
proliferation gained a degree of political salience that further convinced the President of the need 
to show leadership on the issue. Despite Kennedy’s speech, Johnson mentioned in his San 
Francisco addressed that he hoped that "others will join with us in coming to our next 
negotiations with proposals for effective attack upon these deadly dangers to mankind [nuclear 
weapons]."
93
 He assigned primary responsibility for drafting a comprehensive non-proliferation 
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policy, including a multilateral treaty, to the activist ACDA, instead of the skeptical State 
Department.
94
 A new statement from Johnson to the UN’s Eighteen-Nation Disarmament 
Committee in Geneva urged international action to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, restrict 
delivery systems, and draft "a truly comprehensive test-ban treaty."
95
 
 At a meeting of the IAEA in Tokyo on 21 September 1965, Johnson’s remarks, as read 
by his inherited AEC director, Glenn T. Seaborg, revealed that he advocated different tactics 
from Kennedy for his non-proliferation plan: 
 …the IAEA also has the solemn duty—and the unique opportunity—to assure the 
world that materials and equipment employed for peaceful uses of atomic energy 
are not used for any military purpose. Prevention of the spread of atomic weapons 
is one of the most important tasks of our times. It is my deep conviction that the 
IAEA, through its safeguards system, can make a crucial contribution to 
achievement of this goal.
96
 
 
Johnson pledged to do all within his power to "assure the success of the Agency’s system" and 
urged other member states of the UN to do so as well in both "principle and practice." As will be 
seen in Johnson’s dealings with Israel and India, his administration attempted to use its bilateral 
clout to influence countries into accepting international safeguards. Kennedy directly engaged 
with the leaders of potential proliferators on a case-by-case basis. 
 Johnson’s proposal for a multilateral non-proliferation agreement was not the first to be 
discussed in the international arena. On 17 October 1958, the Irish foreign minister, Frank Aiken, 
offered a draft resolution to the General Assembly on the "Further Dissemination of Nuclear 
Weapons," which provided for a weapons production and freeze during negotiations.
97
 However, 
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all NATO countries, concerned about the American nuclear umbrella in Europe, opposed the 
measure. Aiken withdrew the resolution on 31 October.  The following year, Aiken submitted a 
new proposal that would have banned nuclear transfers and placed restrictions on independent 
weapons production by non-nuclear nations.
98
 However the US-backed MLF plan again 
precluded any support from NATO countries. The Swedish delegation submitted an even stricter 
plan in 1961 which explicitly called for: 
an inquiry be  made into the conditions under which countries not possess nuclear 
weapons might be willing to enter into specific undertakings to  refrain from 
manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons and to refuse to receive, in 
the future, nuclear weapons in their territories on behalf of another country.
99
 
 
This language was adopted by the Soviets and rejected by the US and its NATO allies for the 
sake of the MLF.  
 However, by the end of 1965, the situation had changed for the Johnson administration. 
The Chinese explosion, compounded with pressure from Bobby Kennedy, pushed Johnson to 
pursue a multilateral agreement. On 17 August 1965, the US submitted an ACDA draft of a 
treaty to the ENDC.
100
 The first two articles called for: 
1. Each of the Nuclear States party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer any 
nuclear weapon into the national control of any Non-nuclear State, either directly 
or indirectly through a military alliance, and each undertakes not to take any other 
action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other 
organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons. 
 
2. Each of the Nuclear States party to this Treaty undertakes not to assist any 
Non-nuclear State in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
101
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The non-transfer provision of Article I indicates that the United States was willing to abandon 
the MLF scheme for the sake of non-proliferation. However, the Soviet Union offered a 
resolution of their own with very restrictive language which would have banned the stationing of 
American nuclear arms in Europe.
102
 This back-and-forth between the superpowers continued in 
the UN with a series of alternative drafts. 
 It was the small states in the ENDC that changed the mood of the negotiating table. 
India’s representative, in a speech to the ENDC, emphasized the fact that weapons development 
in non-nuclear weapons would not wait for the conclusion of negotiations.
103
 Even the 
ACDA/State Department clash was moderated by the sense of urgency. The State Department’s 
Policy Planning Council produced a document in February 1966, which noted that the: 
Achievement of a separate "non-proliferation agreement" would create an 
additional moral, legal, and political barrier to proliferation of some consequence. 
Such an agreement would, for the standpoint of U.S. interest, be desirable for that 
reason.
104
 
 
The State Department considered a multilateral treaty to be an effective counter-proliferation 
measure that had the added benefit of not straining bilateral relations. The deadlock was broken 
on 24 August 1966, when the American and Soviet delegations submitted identical language to 
the ENDC, which banned transfers of nuclear weapons equipment or shared control of 
weaponry, effectively abandoning the MLF plan.
105
 Foster wrote Rusk on 11 January 1967 and 
argued that diplomatic pressure be placed on NATO countries to coordinate EURATOM 
safeguards on civilian nuclear technology with those of the IAEA.
106
 Rusk agreed and sent 
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instructions to that effect in a telegram to the American Mission in Geneva on 8 March 1967.
107
 
He told American negotiators to stress with NATO representatives that uncoordinated IAEA and 
EURATOM safeguards would undermine the stricter of the two. This shows that Rusk was 
willing to abide by Johnson’s decision to have the ACDA run the non-proliferation agenda. 
Rusk, Foster, and Johnson all believed that the spread of nuclear weapons endangered global 
security and were willing to put aside bureaucratic and internal politics to tackle the problem of 
non-proliferation. 
 Although there were some squabbles between India and the United States over the issue 
of security guarantees, as will be discussed below, the UN Security Council approved ten to zero 
with five abstentions a declaration in favor of ratification of the Treaty on Nonproliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons  by member states.
108
 However, the declaration noted that no formal or explicit 
security guarantees for non-nuclear states were offered by the "nuclear club." The non-binding 
pledges of "immediate assistance" to blackmailed non-nuclear nations did not extend to countries 
considering ratification, such as India. The absence of a security guarantee in the Treaty did little 
to dissipate the political and security pressures for proliferation noted by the State Department’s 
Policy Planning Council in 1966. 
 President Johnson looked proudly on as Secretary of State Rusk signed the NPT in the 
East Room of the White House on 1 July 1968. After the representative of fifty-five other nations 
signed the Treaty, concurrently with their counterparts in London and Moscow, Johnson declared 
that "after nearly a quarter century of danger and fear—reason and sanity have prevailed to 
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reduce the danger and to greatly lessen the fear. Thus, all mankind is reassured."
109
 He restated 
his belief that spread of atomic weaponry increased the likelihood of nuclear war, a belief shared 
by Rusk and Foster, which led them to coordinate the efforts of their respective agencies. 
Although the NPT had a number of provisions which complicated relations with Israel and India, 
as will be discussed below, Johnson nonetheless commented that it kept alive and active the 
"impulse toward a safer world."    
 The New York Times predicted that the Senate would ratify the NPT "without too much 
difficulty."
110
 However, the 90
th
 Congress adjourned on 14 October 1968 and stalled any action 
on the NPT until the inauguration of Richard Nixon.
111
 According to Bundy, Johnson considered 
calling a special session of Congress to get the NPT ratified at once.
112
 Johnson, the consummate 
master of the upper house, noted in his memoirs that dragging senators back to Washington over 
the winter recess would only cause "bad feelings and increased resistance."
113
 Moscow’s 
crackdown in Czechoslovakia led many hawkish senators of both parties to avoid any sign of 
cooperation with the Soviet Union and delay on ratifying the NPT. Johnson also claimed that the 
Republican leadership dragged their heels on ratification so that President-elect Nixon could take 
some credit for the NPT. Johnson bitterly concluded his remarks on the NPT with the assertion 
that "the world would have been better off if we both had moved faster." 
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 After making an amazing political comeback, Nixon declared at his inauguration on 20 
January 1969 that "the greatest honor history can bestow is the title of peacemaker."
114
 However, 
his tenure in office would mark a low point in presidential attention to non-proliferation issues. 
The NSC met to examine the Treaty on 29 January 1969.
115
 Most of the meeting was 
informational and consisted of discussion by the new administration of the NPT's various 
articles. However, Nixon tellingly stated that:  
…treaties don't necessarily get us very much but that people tend to overestimate 
what such a treaty means. For example, suppose a country wanted to make their 
own weapons, then they could obviously abrogate the treaty without sanctions.
116
 
 
Nixon considered the benefits of the Treaty to be minimal, stating that "what we are really going 
to get out of this are prohibitions against what we wouldn't do anyway. Basically, I view the 
value of the treaty as its psychological impact."
117
 Nixon supported the NPT as a symbol, rather 
than in substance. The tactical side of the discussion was not how to get non-signatories to accept 
the NPT, but rather how to deal with the political fallout of the Treaty itself. Nixon stated that he 
wanted policy to gain the public support of the FRG and the US Senate before he would even 
consider bringing the Treaty forward for ratification. Nixon’s final comment before the meeting 
adjourned was: "U.S. people do not want any more commitments, would not permit them and 
despite what the former President had said, we must not get boxed in on this issue."
118
 
 On 5 February 1969, Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s NSA, announced to other high-level 
officials that the President decided to move forward with the ratification of the NPT.
119
 Kissinger 
noted that there should be no pressure—beyond a public "tone of optimism that other countries 
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will sign or ratify"—on other states, especially the FRG. As for the internal government 
approach to proliferation issues, Nixon desired that "the nature of U.S. commitments abroad be 
decided when the need arises, based on the circumstances at the time." National Security 
Memorandum 6 marked the end of the Kennedy-Johnson era of activist non-proliferation policy. 
Nixon and Kissinger considered the NPT to be a complicating factor in international politics, but 
were unwilling to publicly oppose it. As such, the administration paid lip service to the non-
proliferation norm, but was unwilling to throw any material support behind its goals or 
ratification. The consequences of this hesitation were predicted by Foster in two months prior to 
Nixon’s inauguration, who wrote: 
Any substantial delay on our part will be taken by other key potential signatories 
as a sign of lack of US interest and will lead them to reevaluate their own attitudes 
toward the treaty, with the almost certain result that the treaty will not come into 
force.
120
 
 
The Nixon administration did not consider non-proliferation a policy priority. This inattention 
had a direct effect on international politics, as will be seen in the cases of Israel and India. In his 
message to the Senate later on 5 February 1969, Nixon declared that he "always supported the 
goal of halting the spread of nuclear weapons," even if he opposed ratifying the NPT in 1968 
over the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
121
 The first benefit of the Treaty listed by Nixon was 
its value as an advancement of the administration’s "policy of negotiation rather than 
confrontation with the USSR." He simply stated that it would check the spread of nuclear 
weapons, rather than make the world as safer place, as Johnson had. This suggests that Nixon 
still was operating with the Eisenhower-era assumption that vertical proliferation, rather than 
horizontal, was the danger.  Without any sort of presidential pressure to push the Treaty 
                                                 
120
 William C. Foster, “Basic Issues Regarding NPT and Timing of Ratification,” 22 November 1968, p. 9, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc34.pdf (Accessed 23 April 2013). 
121
 Richard M. Nixon, “Message to the Senate Requesting Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Treaty on Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” 5 February 1969, in Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard Nixon, 1969, 1:62. 
[35] 
 
through, it took the Senate until 5 March 1970 to give its advice and consent.
122
 Non-
proliferation disappeared from the public eye until the Indian "Smiling Buddha" nuclear test of 
1974, which prompted a flurry of action. With that explosion, the patchwork nature of American 
formal non-proliferation efforts was apparent for policymakers. However, compromises with 
Israel and India in the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, undermined their formal 
efforts to form a comprehensive policy against the spread of nuclear weapons.  
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The First Test: Israel Gets the Bomb 
So Israel's getting tense. 
Wants one in self defense. 
"The Lord's our shepherd," says the psalm, 
But just in case, we better get a bomb. 
Who's next? 
 
—Tom Lehrer, "Who’s Next?" (1965) 
 
 "We are living in an age of scientific revolutions, an era that discloses the atom, its 
miraculous composition and the tremendous power hidden in it", wrote Israeli Prime Minister 
David Ben-Gurion in a November 1948 pamphlet for new Israeli Defense Force (IDF) 
recruits.
123
 The white-haired Zionist leader had guided the state of Israel through a very troubled 
birth just a few months before, when hostilities broke out between the young country and its 
Arab neighbors just hours after the announcement of the Declaration of the Establishment of the 
State of Israel on the 14
th
 of March. By the time Ben-Gurion published this pamphlet, his people 
had seen two precarious truces collapse in a flurry of gunfire; Israel existed on a knife's edge. 
Although Israel triumphed over its ill-coordinated foes, the threat of a second Holocaust at the 
hands of its Arab neighbors was firmly stamped on Ben-Gurion’s mind. An aide quoted him as 
asking "What is Israel? Only a small spot. One dot! How can it survive in this Arab world?"
124
 
For him, self-reliance and military strength were the only chance for the new Jewish state to 
survive. While he hoped for the day when he could solidify Israel’s position in the Middle East, 
he recognized the vulnerability of a state with a highly concentrated population—it could be 
obliterated with "a single bomb".
125
 By no means could Tel Aviv become an Israeli Hiroshima. 
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In a 27 June 1963 farewell speech to the employees of Israel’s Armaments Development 
Authority (RAFAEL), Ben-Gurion made clear why he considered nuclear weapons necessary for 
Israel’s survival: 
I do not know of any other nation whose neighbors declare that they wish to 
terminate it, and not only declare, but prepare for it by all means available to 
them. We must have no illusions that what is declared every day in Cairo, 
Damascus, Iraq are just words. This is the thought that guides the Arab leaders… 
 Our numbers are small, and there is no chance that we could compare 
ourselves with America’s 180 million, or with any Arab neighboring state. There 
is one thing, however, in which we are not inferior to any other people in the 
world—this is the Jewish brain. And science, if a lay person like myself could 
say, starts from the brain. And the Jewish brain does not disappoint; Jewish 
science does not disappoint… I am confident, based not only on what I heard 
today, that our science can provide us with the weapons that are needed to deter 
our enemies from waging war against us. I am confident that science is able to 
provide us with the weapon that will secure the peace and deter our enemies.
126
 
 
This sentiment is virtually unchanged from April 1948, when a directive to gather Jewish 
scientists in Eastern Europe was justified with the assertion that they could "either increase the 
capacity to kill masses or to cure masses; both things are important."
127
 Both these remarks 
suggest that Ben-Gurion considered nuclear weaponry vital for Israel's survival. 
 The journey of Jewish brain to Israeli bomb was not an easy one. In the early 1950s, only 
the Hebrew University offered courses in physics, which included only one professor of 
theoretical physics and one lecturer in nuclear physics.
128
 However, French humiliation during 
the Suez crisis of the 1956 led them to a nuclear policy more independent from American wishes 
and the ascent of Maurice Bourges-Maunoury as Prime Minister in May 1957 created an 
opportunity for Franco-Israeli cooperation.
129
 Bourges-Maunoury was a close ally of Israeli 
defense establishment wunderkind and Ben-Gurion’s confidant on all matters nuclear, Shimon 
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Peres, who rose quickly in the bureaucracy because of his reputation for success and miraculous 
procurement of arms and other military supplies.
130
 Two agreements, one political and one 
technical, were signed on 3 October 1957 in utmost secret and pledged French support for the 
building of an Israeli nuclear research site near Dimona, a recently-developed city in the Negev 
Desert.
131
 Although Israel’s nuclear program is to this day covered in a heavy blanket of official 
censorship to this day, Israeli historian and nuclear expert Avner Cohen estimates that the 
Dimona project broke ground in late 1957 or early 1958.
132
 In April 1959, a secret British report 
referred to a verbal slip by Peres: 
We noted, but did not report at the time, a speech made by Shimon Peres… at a 
symposium in the Weizmann Institute [of Science] on February 1 in which he 
criticized the theoretical nature of the research being done at the Institute and 
referred briefly to a "secret weapon" which Israel was trying to obtain… 
 The veil of security which was immediately pulled over this speech—one 
of Peres’ typically indiscreet efforts—prevented us from finding out to which 
weapon Peres referred… 
 
The Embassy then sought to allay fears of nuclear proliferation in the Foreign Office by 
reporting that the Ministry of Defense had reached the conclusion "that it would be foolish for 
Israel to try and get an atomic bomb, both because of the expense and because even if Israel were 
successful, the Soviet Union would undoubtedly arm the Arab countries in similar fashion."
 133
 This Israeli obsession with "nuclear opacity" makes it nearly impossible for a historian to 
know exactly when the Dimona site produced a nuclear bomb. Shlomo Aronson and Oded Brosh 
estimate that Dimona had produced enough weapons-grade plutonium for a bomb between 1965 
and 1967 and that the French tested a missile delivery system for Israel in 1966, though this is 
accompanied by the caveat that the unknown sophistication of the weapon could increase 
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estimated development time by several years.
134
 Cohen more firmly decided on 1966 as the 
crucial year: 
…Israel had thus obtained, or was about to obtain, the three components that 
constitute a nuclear weapons capability: Fissile material production capacity, 
design knowledge, and access to delivery means.
135
 
 
Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh estimated that Israel had a nuclear weapon by June 1967, 
though he relies on a single Israeli source, the boastful pride of a 1948 veteran and future prime 
minister, Yigal Allon, who reportedly had a tour of a missile sight under construction in 
December of that year.
136
 
 The uncertainty of recent historical research on Israel’s nuclear weapons program should 
come as no surprise. Most primary information readily available to the contemporary researcher 
comes from foreign intelligence, personal interviews, and a great degree of guesswork. The 
American intelligence community was unable to decisively assert that Israel had a bomb until a 
1974 Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) entitled "Prospects for Further Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons". Likely eight years after the fact and certainly after two major Arab-Israeli 
wars, SNIE 4-1-74 asserted the following: 
We believe that Israel already has produced nuclear weapons. Our judgment 
is based on Israeli acquisition of large quantities of uranium, partly by clandestine 
means; the ambiguous nature of Israeli efforts in the field of uranium enrichment; 
and Israel’s large investment in a costly missile system designed to accommodate 
nuclear warheads. We do not expect the Israelis to provide confirmation of 
widespread suspicions of their capability, either by nuclear testing or by 
threats of use, short of a grave threat to the nation’s existence.137 
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This conclusion shows that the intelligence community admitted significantly after the fact that 
Israel likely had nuclear weapons. Israel’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon was one of America’s 
first non-proliferation challenges. However, the intelligence community gave remarkably mixed 
signals to policymakers concerning the Israeli weapons program. From the end of the 1950s to 
the 1974 SNIE, the intelligence community would consistently ignore data, offer unfounded 
speculation, and backtrack from previous conclusions. This failure of intelligence analysis to 
provide their customers in the White House with proper information contributed to the creation 
of a separate reality for policymakers, in which the spread of nuclear weapons was being 
checked. 
 The Dimona facility was discovered by accident in early 1958. A U-2 surveillance flight 
over an Israeli practice bombing range in the Negev Desert discovered extensive excavations and 
construction, which analysts determined to be a "probable" nuclear site.
138
 Arthur C. Lundahl, 
director of CIA’s Photographic Intelligence Center (CIA/PIC), took briefing boards of the 
Dimona excavations to President Eisenhower and Lewis Strauss, chairman of the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC). Lundahl reported that the usually intelligence-voracious Eisenhower "did 
not say a word" during the briefing and made no request for follow-up surveillance.
139
 This habit 
of presidents selectively ignoring politically inconvenient intelligence would be repeated time 
and time again in the Israeli case. Dimona was soon forgotten, until June 1960, when the US 
Embassy in Tel-Aviv reported rumors of Israeli-French collaboration on an atomic energy 
project in the Negev Desert, near the city of Beersheba.
140
 This prompted a flurry of activity 
during the final months of the Eisenhower presidency. Amory Houghton, the US Ambassador to 
France, cabled Washington on 19 October 1960 to report the official French denial of any 
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collaboration with the construction of the Dimona site and information from a representative of 
an American nuclear reactor company returning from Tel Aviv, who also denied the existence of 
an Israeli nuclear power project.
141
 However, John A. McCone, Chairman of the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) and future Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) under Kennedy, sought to 
hedge his bets by meeting with a New York Times reporter in December and sputtering in rage 
"they [the Israelis] lied to us… they said it was a textile plant".142 The Times dutifully obliged 
him by reporting in a December 18
th
 article that "the suspicion of United States officials about 
the Israel project has been heightened by the fact that Israel has made no public announcement 
about the reactor, nor has she privately informed the United States of her plan."
143
 
 President Kennedy, a week after assuming office, expressed his desire for a review of 
intelligence the CIA had to date on the Dimona site.
144
 Apparently Kennedy was not pleased 
with the CIA’s failure to connect the proverbial dots, so the US Intelligence Board (USIB) 
requested an official post-mortem on 13 December 1960, which was duly produced.
145
 The 
Agency dutifully concluded that it had failed to recognize developments at Dimona, and that in 
the interest of "more prompt detection of the possible quest for a nuclear weapons capability by 
other potential ‘Nth’ countries", the intelligence community should coordinate better on highly 
technical nuclear issues.
146
 This report included minor admissions of failure on the part of the 
CIA and mostly externalized blame to the State Department and Atomic Energy Commission. 
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Cohen, citing numerous interviews with Kennedy advisors, asserts that "no American president 
was more concerned with the danger of nuclear proliferation".
147
 Israeli weapons development 
deeply concerned Kennedy. 
  A mere ten days after assuming office, the new President received a memo from his 
Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, summarizing all information available about the Dimona site at 
that time, which was minimal. Apart from the photo analysis and scraps of human intelligence 
(HUMINT) from the late 1950s, Rusk was only able to report "rumors" received at the Tel Aviv 
embassy of Franco-Israeli collaboration on the Dimona reactor’s construction and noted that all 
previous intelligence suggested "that Israel has no plans for developing atomic weaponry", which 
was corroborated by the French.
148
 He very clearly stated why Kennedy should take an interest in 
preventing an Israeli bomb: 
a) Pursuant to congressional legislation and firm executive branch policy the 
United States is opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities; and 
b) Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would have grave repercussions in the 
Middle East, not the least of which might be the probable stationing of Soviet 
nuclear weapons on the soil of Israel’s embittered Arab neighbors.149 
 
Rusk's initial summary was reflective of Kennedy’s own position on nuclear weapons in Israel, a 
position which was maintained for the rest of his life. The memo also noted that the American 
government was "encouraging the Israelis to permit a qualified scientist from the United States 
or other friendly power to visit the Dimona installation." The next day, Kennedy consulted the 
outgoing Ambassador to Israel, Ogden Reid, who confirmed the notion that the Dimona reactor 
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was intended for peaceful purposes and suggested that inspections could be palatable to the 
Israelis, so long as they were secret.
150
 
 After much delay on the Israeli side concerning the scheduling of the visit, the cover of 
the American scientists, and a preliminary one-on-one between Kennedy and Ben-Gurion, the 
visit was scheduled for 18 May 1961.
151
 State Department instructions for the AEC scientists 
included advice on controlling leaks and concealing their mission from the public.
152
 Ulysses M. 
Staebler, assistant director of AEC reactor development, and Jesse Croach, an AEC expert on 
heavy water, arrived in Tel Aviv on the evening of May 17th.
153
 They were received "very 
cordially" by the director of the Dimona facility, Manes Pratt, and were given a tour.
154
 Pictures 
were not allowed and the Americans were informed that everything they saw was to be treated as 
classified, ostensibly to keep Israel’s Arab enemies in the dark and to prevent them from 
retaliating against their suppliers. The scientists were thoroughly impressed by what they saw 
and reported to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy that "Israel’s Dimona project is a 
most creditable accomplishment both in concept and execution."
155
 This visit represents another 
failure by the American government to discover the capacity for nuclear weapons development 
at the Dimona site. However, the intention of the scientists’ visit was to verify, not challenge, 
Israeli assertions about the facility.
156
 The scientists were not given support from the intelligence 
community, which did not provide them access to U-2 photos of Dimona. What they saw 
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matched up with the official explanation they were given; as official guests, they simply were not 
shown the large underground plutonium reprocessing plant, which would later produce the 
necessary fissile material for an Israeli weapon. 
 The overly-optimistic Dimona report allayed Kennedy’s fears and resulted in a very 
smooth visit with Ben-Gurion at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel on 30 May 1961. A satisfied 
Kennedy encouraged the Prime Minister to allow dissemination of the American findings to the 
world, particularly the Arab nations surrounding Israel.
157
 Given Kennedy’s democratic personal 
life, he used a particularly interesting analogy to justify the need for Israeli openness on the 
nuclear issue: "a woman should not only be virtuous, but also have the appearance of virtue". 
Ben-Gurion assented and emphasized the importance of civilian nuclear power for Israeli 
development. The notes taken by the Israeli delegation suggest that they would not be the "first 
mover" toward nuclear weapons in the Middle East: 
We are asked whether it [the Dimona reactor] is for peace. For the time being the 
only purposes are for peace. Not now but after three or four years we shall have a 
pilot plant for separation, which is needed anyway for a power reactor. There is 
no such intention now, not for 4 or 5 years. But we will see what happens in the 
Middle East. It does not depend on us. Maybe Russia won’t give bombs to China 
or Egypt, but maybe Egypt will develop them herself.
158
 
 
The Israeli understanding of their nuclear situation was shared by the Americans, who reported: 
Israel’s main—and for the time being, only—purpose is this [cheap nuclear 
power], the Prime Minister said, adding that "we do not know what will happen in 
the future; in three or four years we might have a need for a plant to process 
plutonium." Commenting on the political and strategic implications of atomic 
power and weaponry, the Prime Minister said he does believe that "in ten or 
fifteen years the Egyptians presumably could achieve it themselves."
159
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Kennedy, while satisfied with Ben-Gurion’s answer, was concerned about the consequences of 
Israeli weapons development should this bilateral understanding fail. If Israel were to defy 
American interests and build a bomb, Kennedy feared  it would not only ignite tensions in the 
Middle East, but also undermine the budding non-proliferation norm. It is important to remember 
that there were only four countries with nuclear weapons in 1961: the United States, the Soviet 
Union, Great Britain, and, since 1960, France. Kennedy’s far-sighted policy toward the Dimona 
reactor was guided by its implications for the future, not for the present. In short, the threat for 
Kennedy was not the small, controllable blaze of proliferation in 1961, but a future wildfire. 
 The Dimona reactor did not present Kennedy with any major issues for the rest of his 
term of office. In a 27 December 1962 meeting with Golda Meir, then Israel’s Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Kennedy only brought up the Dimona reactor in a peripheral manner and his 
fears were allayed yet again in an easy manner by Meir.
160
 Seven additional visits to the site 
during the 1960s confirmed the existing American notion that it was not being used for weapons 
production.
161
  However, Kennedy’s fears of nuclear proliferation ensured that monitoring of the 
Dimona facility was maintained throughout his term of office. 
 A second bilateral confrontation with the Israeli government was triggered in 1963 by the 
failure of the Kennedy administration to broker a multilateral nuclear agreement in Europe. The 
dangers of nuclear war revealed by the Cuban Missile Crisis steeled Kennedy’s resolve to 
minimize the possibility for further nuclear confrontation anywhere in the world. In March 1963, 
Kennedy vocalized these fears publicly: 
 Personally I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful, 
there may be ten nuclear powers instead of four, and by 1975, fifteen or twenty… 
I see the possibility in the 1970s of the President of the United States having to 
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face a world in which fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these 
weapons. I regard this as the greatest danger and hazard.
162
 
 
The post-Cuba attention to proliferation issues in the Kennedy administration combined with a 
missile race in the Middle East raised the specter of Israeli nuclear weapons from Dimona again. 
  Egypt paraded newly-acquired ballistic missiles in July 1962 on Revolution Day and 
boasted that they could hit any target "south of Beirut", i.e. all of Israel.
163
 American intelligence 
successfully kept Kennedy informed about Israeli negotiations to buy MD-620 "Jericho" missiles 
from the French firm Marcel Dassault, which was agreed upon on 26 April 1963.
164
 Kennedy’s 
concern over a Middle Eastern arms race resulted in National Security Action Memorandum 
(NSAM) 231, which stated: 
The President desires, as a matter of urgency, that we undertake every feasible 
measure to improve our intelligence on the Israeli nuclear program as well as 
other Israeli and UAR [United Arab Republic, i.e. modern Egypt and Syria] 
advanced weapons programs and to arrive at a firmer evaluation of their import. 
In this connection he wishes the next formal inspection of the Israeli reactor 
complex to be undertaken promptly and to be as thorough as possible. 
 In view of his great concern over the destabilizing impact of any Israeli or 
UAR program looking toward the development of nuclear weapons, the President 
also wishes the Department of State to develop proposals for forestalling such 
programs; in particular we should develop plans for seeking clearer assurances 
from the governments concerned on this point, and means of impressing upon 
them how seriously such a development would be regarded in this country.
165
 
 
Sherman Kent, head of the CIA’s Office of National Estimates, produced a memorandum on 6 
March 1963, which noted the dire consequences of an Israeli bomb for American interests, but 
was uncertain if Dimona had the capacity to separate plutonium for a weapon.
166
 SNIE 30-2-63, 
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entitled "The Advanced Weapons Programs of the UAR and Israel" summarized American 
intelligence on the Israeli weapons development program: 
We have no positive evidence that the Israeli nuclear program is aimed at 
achieving a nuclear weapons capability. However, the size of the program, what 
we know of its nature, and the amount of uranium concentrate acquired all 
suggest that Israel intends at least to put itself in a position to be able to produce a 
limited number of weapons relatively quickly after a decision to do so.
167
 
 
The estimate also asserted that Israel would have an arsenal of surface to surface missiles 
(SSMs) with a range of 250-300 nautical miles within two to four years. In 1963, Israel had, or 
was uncomfortably close to, all the technical elements of a nuclear strike capacity: fissile 
material production capacity, design knowledge, and means of delivery. The vital factor, and the 
most difficult to gauge, was Israeli intent. It all came down to Ben-Gurion. 
 After Ben-Gurion stalled on the issue of semiannual American inspections of the Dimona 
facility, Kennedy sent a series of messages to the Israeli Prime Minister and after much 
dissembling on the Israeli side, sent a very confrontational personal note on 18 May 1963. In this 
note, Kennedy noted that the American security commitment to Israel "would be seriously 
jeopardized… if it should be thought that this Government was unable to obtain reliable 
information on a subject as vital to peace as the question of Israel’s efforts in the nuclear 
field."
168
 Ben-Gurion never got the letter. The American Ambassador to Israel, Walworth 
Barbour, cabled back to Washington that the elder statesman of Israel had resigned that day, 15 
September 1963.
169
 
 On 5 July 1963, Kennedy sent a near-identical letter to Ben-Gurion’s successor as Prime 
Minister, Levi Eshkol, bluntly stating once again that US support for Israel "could be seriously 
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jeopardized" should American scientists be denied access to "all areas of the Dimona site and to 
any related part of the complex, such as fuel fabrication facilities, or the plutonium separation 
plant."
170
 According to Cohen, Kennedy’s letter, lacking the context of previous discussions with 
the highly secretive Ben-Gurion, was received very poorly by Eshkol, who viewed it as a breach 
of diplomatic protocol, an insult to Israeli sovereignty, and an American attempt to bully him 
while he found his bearings.
171
 However, Eshkol decided to avoid confrontation and played for 
time. He was no foe to Ben-Gurion’s nuclear policy, in fact, his was remarkably similar. In an 
editorial meeting, Eshkol asserted that Israel "should act up to our limits, but we should always 
make sure that it would not create a rift with the United States."
172
 This eventually led him to 
reassure Kennedy yet again that Dimona was being used for peaceful purposes and told him that 
they would  "be able to reach agreement on the future schedule of visits."
173
 
 This reassurance from Eshkol settled the Dimona issue for the Kennedy administration. 
While he disappointed the Prime Minister by refusing to provide a formal guarantee for Israel, 
Kennedy expressed a firm commitment to the "security and independence of Israel" and asserted 
that United States had "the will and ability to carry out its stated determination to preserve it."
174
 
The letter did not link the security issue to the Dimona facility or even mention the site. Cohen 
asserts that this Kennedy-Eshkol understanding caused America and Israel to stumble "further 
down the path of nuclear opacity".
175
 Lee Harvey Oswald’s bullet on 22 November 1963 brought 
an end to John F. Kennedy’s presidency and drained the Israeli nuclear issue of its urgency. 
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 Lyndon B. Johnson treated Israel’s nuclear program very differently than his predecessor. 
Johnson faced, quite simply, a different world. He was not involved as Vice-President with the 
Israeli nuclear issue. Non-proliferation was gaining attention on the international stage through 
the efforts of the Irish and Swedish delegations at the UN, who received the backing of the US 
and the Soviet Union, respectively.
176
 
 However, information was coming in which should have led to more focused American 
monitoring for Israeli defection from their bilateral agreement with Kennedy. A report written by 
AEC personnel following a ten-hour visit to Dimona on 28 January 1965 argued: 
16. While there appears to be no near term possibility of a weapons development 
program at the Dimona site, the site has excellent development and production 
capability that warrants continued surveillance at maximum intervals of one year. 
17. Neither the total Israeli capability to produce nature uranium nor to 
manufacture Pu [Plutonium] at Dimona is now being used… However the 
potential to enter into these companion efforts is there and could be implemented 
by installing additional equipment."
177
 
 
Rusk, having dealt with the Dimona issue since the start of his tenure as Secretary of State, was 
very suspicious of the relatively benign AEC findings and Israeli intentions. He wrote a memo to 
Bundy entitled "Dimona Inspection and Need to Implement Initiative to Prevent Nuclear 
Proliferation in the Near East." He listed the following facts as reasons to suspect Israeli motives: 
1. Israel concealed the existence of the Dimona reactor from us for about two 
years. 
2. Israeli officials did not allow adequate time for thorough inspection of the 
Dimona site and arranged no visits to sites of projected related facilities. 
3. Israeli officials ruled questions about procurement of uranium from abroad 
"outside the scope of the visits" and suggested taking them up through normal 
diplomatic channels. 
4. Israel is acquiring missiles from France designed to accommodate either high-
explosive or nuclear warhead. 
5. Public and private statements by Israeli officials suggest military planning that 
includes the use of nuclear weapons.
178
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These breaches of trust led Rusk to suggest a departure from the Kennedy tactic of bilateral deals 
to pushing Israel to accept IAEA safeguards.
179
 However, stories from New York Times, written 
by John Finney, who broke the story on the Dimona facility for Dulles back in 1960, revealed the 
secret American "inspections" of the site.
180
 The term "inspections" rekindled Israeli concerns 
about sovereignty in nuclear matters and forced the United States to temporarily ease pressure on 
Dimona. The American "visit"—not "inspection"— of 6 April 1966 did not raise any signs of 
weapons development, nor did the following one on 22 April 1967.
181
 However, as discussed 
above, most current scholarship places the Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons sometime 
between 1966 and 1967, certainly prior to the Six-Day War of June 1967. 
 The United States was not aware that Israel developed nuclear weapons. American 
policymakers’ knowledge of Israeli capabilities was virtually unchanged from 1963. Rusk’s 
suspicions of Israeli intentions had no confirmation from the intelligence community. The 
findings of NIE 4-66, "The Likelihood of Further Proliferation", prompted by the Chinese test of 
a nuclear device in 1964, suggested that "beyond the present five nuclear powers, only India is 
likely to undertake a nuclear weapons program in the next several years."
182
 NIE 4-66 suggested 
that the Israelis "might do so".
183
 However, the CIA determined that the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons could be delayed "for the next few years, at least," should the Israelis feel secure 
through shipments of conventional weapons from the West.
184
 This NIE also supported 
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Johnson’s move toward broader international restrictions on the Israeli program.185 The failure of 
the intelligence community to raise a sense of urgency about the Israeli nuclear program, 
compounded with inconclusive information reaching the White House via diplomatic channels, 
contributed to the dulling of American non-proliferation policy during the Johnson 
administration. 
 However, inaccurate information being given to policymakers by the State Department, 
AEC, and CIA cannot be described as the main reason for the American inability to check 
Israel’s nuclear ambitions; the policymakers themselves must be held accountable. This is not to 
say that Johnson ignored the issue of non-proliferation. On 9 February 1966, Rusk told Israeli 
Foreign Minister Abba Eban directly that the "only major question that could have disastrous 
effect on US-Israeli relations was GOI [government of Israel] attitude on proliferation" and 
added that the United States would be "extremely clear and utterly harsh on [the] matter of non-
proliferation".
186
 However, given the lack of urgency from the intelligence community and the 
State Department on the Dimona facility, Johnson’s nuclear relations with Israel primarily 
focused on getting that country to sign a multilateral Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Originally 
intended to replace Kennedy’s bilateral agreement with Eshkol, which "bred uneasiness, even 
resentment, on both sides", Johnson thought that broader measures, like the NPT, would better 
stem the spread of nuclear weapons.
187
 However, he did not link the signing of the Treaty to the 
sale of American F-4 Phantom fighter jets, which allowed Eshkol to stall and dissemble on the 
issue.
188
 He stalled until Richard Nixon became President-elect on 5 November 1968. Rusk 
described Israel’s nuclear status at that time as being "5-months pregnant," but corrected himself 
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in his autobiography by asserting that it was "at least eight and three-fourths months pregnant 
and could produce nuclear weapons on very short notice."
189
 All of Rusk’s suspicions came to 
naught. He, Johnson, and the rest of the administration left the White House in January, ending 
the Kennedy legacy of non-proliferation. 
 US policy toward Israel’s nuclear program did not prevent the development of a bomb 
during the Johnson administration. In order to cope with the tactical problems of the bilateral 
agreement concerning Dimona, Johnson attempted to restrict nth power weapons development 
through international inspections with the IAEA and the regulations of the NPT. Therefore, his 
non-proliferation policy shifted from the narrow sense, i.e. stopping the spread on a case-by-case 
basis, to the broad sense—efforts to strengthen the international norm. Unknowingly, this shift in 
short-term tactics gave the Israeli program time to develop weapons. American inspections and 
intelligence gave no indication that Israel had the infrastructure or made the decision to pursue 
the bomb. Despite the best intentions, American non-proliferation policy was too broad and 
policymakers had no clue that it was not working. 
 It would take until the Nixon administration for American policymakers to recognize that 
Israel had nuclear weapons. Shortly after his inauguration, Nixon informed his Cabinet that the 
United States would ratify the NPT. However, in a classified national Security Decision 
memorandum circulated to leading administration officials, his National Security Advisor, Henry 
Kissinger, noted that: 
The President directed that, associated with the decision to proceed with U.S. 
ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there should be no efforts by the U.S. 
Government to pressure other nations… to follow suit. The Government in its 
public posture should reflect a tone of optimism that other countries will sign or 
ratify, while clearly dissociating itself from any plan to bring pressure on these 
countries to sign or ratify.
190
 
                                                 
189
 Quoted in Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 320-321. 
190
 Kissinger, “National Security Decision Memorandum 6,” 1. 
[53] 
 
 
This approach characterized Nixon’s approach to non-proliferation. He publicly supported 
checking the spread of nuclear weapons, but was unwilling to strain bilateral relations with nth 
power countries or subordinate geopolitical goals for the sake of the NPT.  
 Henry Wilson, a Johnson administration hold-over, future director of the Brookings 
Institution, and Chairman of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council, wrote Secretary 
Rogers a memo two days later on the "Impact on U.S. Policies of an Israeli Nuclear Weapons 
Capability."
191
 Wilson was not only concerned about nuclear weapons’ destabilizing effect on 
the Middle East, but also their effect on the nascent non-proliferation norm. He wrote that one 
"far-reaching and unfavorable" result of an Israeli weapon’s disclosure would be that: 
Other nuclear capable countries would be more likely to opt in favor of nuclear 
weapons for themselves and, even if they did not decide to produce weapons 
immediately, would be less likely to sign the NPT.
192
 
 
This memo reveals a typical Johnson-era premise for combating the spread of nuclear weapons: 
proliferation incentivizes further weapons development by nth power countries. This concern 
was shared by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, who argued that the United States should 
withhold the delivery of a CDC 6400 computer to Israel, as it "could be a critical tool" in Israel’s 
weapons program and lead to the introduction of atomic weaponry into the Middle East.
193
  
 Another voice urging Nixon and Kissinger to pressure the Israelis was Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph J. Sisco. In a memo for 
Kissinger, Sisco advocated "[heading] off Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and nuclear-
capable strategic missiles" as "one of the most important objectives of our Middle East 
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policy."
194
 He also believed that the United States should pressure Eshkol’s successor as premier, 
Golda Meir, to sign and ratify the NPT. In order to induce Meir to comply with American 
wishes, Sisco suggested that the US government would have to suggest that the acquisition of a 
nuclear device would "cause a fundamental change in the US-Israel relationship, including our 
long-standing concern for Israel’s security." Sisco believed that only the threat of severely 
damaging bilateral relations with the US or the establishment of a lasting peace with the Arab 
countries could induce Israel to give up its weapons program. In practicality, however, Sisco 
considered anything short of heavy-handed use of American influence to be "futile."
195
 Even 
linking individual shipments of American arms to the nuclear issue was an insufficient threat to 
get Israel to budge from its stance on nuclear weapons. 
 Kissinger was unwilling to strong-arm the Israelis and sacrifice other security interests 
for the sake of halting weapons development. He argued in a discussion group that "we should 
avoid direct confrontation with Israel as well as public knowledge of Israeli nuclear activities."
196
 
The group concluded that the United States should attempt to extract a public declaration from 
Meir that Israel would not develop nuclear weapons—even if such weapons already existed, as 
this would force Israel to "hide" its arsenal from the public view. This discussion marked the 
beginnings of American collaboration with the Israeli policy of nuclear opacity. By neither 
publicly confirming nor denying the existence of nuclear weapons, Israel could still have the 
perceived benefit of deterring the Arab states without undermining the non-proliferation norm 
and antagonizing the United States. In a telephone conversation with Undersecretary of State 
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Elliot Richardson, Kissinger mentioned that Nixon was "leery" of pressuring Israel at all with a 
shipment of F-4 Phantom fighter jets before Meir could meet with him in person.
197
 Nixon was 
unwilling to place non-proliferation over the American alliance with Israel. 
 In the weeks prior to Meir’s visit, Israel gave several signs of that it would not oblige the 
United States on nuclear matters. First, in response to concerns over Israel’s delay to ratify the 
NPT, the Israeli Ambassador to the US and future Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, reassured 
Richardson that Israel was still "studying" the implications of ratification, an answer previously 
given to placate President Johnson.
198
 Richardson attempted to clarify what the Israeli promise to 
not be the first country to "introduce" nuclear weapons into the Middle East meant—did it mean 
not building a bomb or not acknowledging its existence through a public announcement or test? 
This was a previous sore spot in negotiations over the NPT and Ambassador Rabin ended the 
conversation by stating that the Israeli position was well-known and that "he would of course 
convey Mr. Richardson’s comments to Jerusalem."199 Ambassador Barbour conveyed the 
concern to Meir on 31 July 1969 that the American inspection team had not been allowed full 
access to the Dimona reactor, but Meir denied his request to schedule a more complete 
inspection, citing the necessary and untimely involvement of the Knesset prior to national 
elections.
200
 On 28 August, Rabin again rebuffed Richardson’s requests for more information 
about Israel’s nuclear intentions, claiming that it was too "difficult" a subject for Israel to tackle 
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prior to the opening of the polls.
201
 The Israeli government was clearly stonewalling, but Nixon 
refused to pressure them into cooperating. 
 Meir’s coalition handily won the 28 October 1969 election, which allowed nuclear 
negotiations to resume. Secretary of State Rogers urged Nixon to cut through Rabin’s demurrals 
and press Meir for a "full and frank discussion" of Israel’s nuclear policy.202 Richardson wrote a 
briefing book for Kissinger on 19 September in anticipation of Meir’s visit and noted that: 
Israel resents our position, but may well have concluded that, since we have not 
gone beyond words in pressing our point, we are actually resigned to seeing Israel 
become a nuclear power. Israel has worked to acquire a nuclear weapons 
capability as rapidly as circumstances permit. She may already have attained it.
203
 
 
This briefing book represents one final attempt by strong non-proliferation voices within the 
Nixon administration to make apparent the distinct possibility that Israel already possessed 
nuclear weaponry, which it did. 
 No record exists of Nixon’s conversation with Meir, but a number of subsequent 
documents indicate that perhaps she told him that Israel possessed nuclear weapons. Following 
the meeting with Meir, Kissinger noted in a memo that the American government was concerned 
about the "visible" introduction of weapons into the Middle East by Israel.
204
 This suggests that 
Kissinger—and therefore  Nixon—accepted and adopted the Israeli policy of nuclear opacity by 
wishing to avoid the public confirmation of a weapons program, instead of preventing weapons 
development itself. The American government was complicit in Israeli duplicity, as Rabin finally 
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answered Richardson’s earlier questions by stating that Israel would "not become a nuclear 
power [emphasis added]." Kissinger noted that this declaration allowed Israel to (inaccurately) 
remain classified as a "non-nuclear power" under the NPT regime.
205
 He believed that the United 
States would "have to settle for… an Israeli commitment that will prevent Israeli nuclear 
weapons from becoming a known factor and further complicating the Arab-Israeli situation."
206
 
He recommended that the American reply to Rabin emphasize that Israel, as a "non-nuclear" 
state, should privately abide by the NPT provisions forbidding the receipt or manufacture of 
nuclear arms by not building any additional devices. A private assurance would alleviate some 
American concerns while allowing Israel to delay on a decision on the NPT. 
 Thus began the American cover-up on the Israeli weapons program. Non-proliferation 
voices, such as Sisco and Barbour were denied copies of records on the Nixon-Meir 
conversations, presumably in order to solidify the American side of nuclear opacity.
207
 On 23 
February 1970, Rabin stopped his waffling and told Kissinger that "in the light of the 
conversation between the President and Golda Meir... Israel [had] no intention to sign the 
NPT."
208
 He also openly told Kissinger that any attempt to pressure Israel into signing the NPT 
through arms deals would be "extremely unfortunate." This bold declaration from the Israeli 
Ambassador indicated that any hope of countering Israel’s nuclear weapons program was gone. 
Nixon was willing to reach an understanding with Meir and move on to coping with the 
geopolitical implications of Israeli possession, instead of continuing to advocate non-
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proliferation. Opponents of the Israeli program within the American government were kept in the 
dark by Nixon and Kissinger, as is indicated by a request from Robert Munn, head of the Israel 
desk at the State Department, to authorize another routine inspection of the Dimona site—a 
request which was blocked by Kissinger from discussion in the Cabinet.
209
 
 The Nixon-Meir conversation almost certainly marked the point when a small group of 
high-level American policymakers were informed of Israeli possession of nuclear weapons. The 
adoption of a policy of opacity toward Israel’s development program indicates that non-
proliferation was secondary to maintaining a strong relationship with Israel and the stability of 
the Middle East’s strategic situation. This policy continued after Nixon’s resignation. On 15 
October 1975, State Department officials, including Sisco, drafted a response to questions about 
Israel’s nuclear status raised in a congressional hearing. The response included administration 
officials releasing a statement challenging the assertion in the CIA’s SNIE 4-1-74 that Israel 
"already [had] produced nuclear weapons."
210
 To the contrary, the State Department would state 
that it believed Israel had "the technical and scientific capability to produce nuclear weapons if it 
chooses," but that there was no "concrete evidence" of possession—a blatant obfuscation. 
 Although the Kennedy administration actively sought to prevent Israel from building a 
bomb, complications from inspections of the Dimona site led his successor, Johnson, to place his 
trust in the NPT and IAEA inspections, which gave Israel time to build nuclear explosives. 
However, the terms of the Treaty were too constricting for the Israeli government to accept and 
were too important for the United States to ignore, so they delayed on a decision until the 
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political situation in America allowed them to overtly refuse. That situation changed arrived with 
Nixon and Kissinger in the White House, who were not deeply concerned with confronting the 
issue of proliferation. As noted above, it seems likely that Nixon and Kissinger viewed the 
acquisition of an atomic bomb by Israel as inevitable and were concerned with the consequences 
of leaving the Israeli nuclear question open. By the end of the Nixon administration, the 
American government was actively collaborating with a proliferating power in secret and misled 
the American public.
[60] 
 
The Paradox: Confronting India’s Nuclear Weapons Program 
The moral to be legitimately drawn from the supreme tragedy of the bomb is that it will not be 
destroyed by counter-bombs even as violence cannot be by counter-violence. Mankind has to get 
out of violence only through non-violence. 
 
—Mahatma Gandhi, 30 January 1948211 
 
There are no political or foreign policy implications of this test. 
 
—Indira Gandhi to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 22 May 1974212 
 
 The Republic of India reported to the world that it had conducted a "peaceful nuclear 
explosion experiment" (PNE) one hundred meters underground in the Rajasthani desert, near 
Pokhran, on 18 May 1974.
213
 Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, responding to a query about 
the test’s effect on Indian prominence on the global stage, replied: "I never bother about prestige. 
It is nothing to get excited about. We are firmly committed to the peaceful uses of atomic 
energy."
214
 The official reaction from the US State Department was that "the United States has 
always been against nuclear proliferation for the adverse impact it will have on world 
stability."
215
 Nixon, who had an "extraordinarily carefree view of nuclear proliferation," in the 
opinion of Kennedy and Johnson foreign policy advisor William Bundy, does not seem to have 
been troubled by the test.
216
 Pakistan’s alarmed Minister for Defense and Foreign Affairs, Aziz 
Ahmed, told Nixon: "We are worried. We are holding out, trying to work for peace. You have 
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been very kind and gracious…"217 Nixon’s weak reply consisted of a promise to "begin an 
assessment… on the implications of the Indian nuclear weapons." 
 Bundy asserted that Nixon’s non-response was even more baffling given Indo-Pak 
nuclear tensions during the 1990s than it was in the 1970s.
218
 Although Bundy's affiliation with 
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations raises the question of bias, it seems fair to assert that 
the Indian test marked a dramatic shift in the balance of power in South Asia. India, as the first 
non-aligned nation and the second leg in the Sino-Pakistani-Indian security triangle to explode a 
nuclear device, publicly demonstrated to the United States the dangers of nuclear proliferation 
and encouraged a flurry of activity in the Congress and by Nixon’s successor, Gerald Ford. 
 The hesitation—or political inability—of American policymakers in the 1960s and early 
1970s to place significant international controls on civilian nuclear technology gave the Indian 
nuclear program time to secure the necessary technology, expertise, and infrastructure for 
weapons development. Nixon and Kissinger, who were surprised by the Indian test, ignored its 
implications for global security—the implications that drew the attention of the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations— and merely adjusted to a new condition in international politics. 
 The Indian case is one fraught with contradiction. Gandhi condemned atomic weaponry 
as the final folly of ideological violence, a development to be reviled in both India and the 
international community.
219
 Opposition to nuclear weapons was closely linked to the threads of 
non-violence and non-alignment in Indian nationalist thought. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first 
Prime Minister, speaking in the lower house of Parliament in 1957, declared: "[W]e have 
declared quite clearly that we are not interested in and we will not make these bombs, even if we 
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have the capacity to do so."
220
 The strength of this anti-nuclear norm should not be 
underestimated. Even in 1974, when India acquired a nuclear capability, Indira Gandhi insisted 
the explosion was "peaceful" and that the demonstration of a capacity for weaponization was not 
the same as the possession.  
 However, the theme of Indian national self-sufficiency was also of great importance to 
Nehru, who had a "decidedly modernist vision" for the country—one that included nuclear 
power plants and atomic bombs.
221
 Speaking in Bombay in 1946, Nehru revealed both a keen 
understanding of realpolitik and similar thinking to Ben-Gurion on nuclear issues: 
As long as the world is constituted as it is, every country will have to devise and 
use the latest scientific devices for its protection. I have no doubt India will 
develop her scientific researches and I hope Indian scientists will use the atomic 
force for constructive purposes. But if India is threatened she will inevitably try to 
defend herself by all means at her disposal. I hope India in common with other 
countries will prevent the use of atomic bombs.
222
 
 
This duality in official thought on nuclear weapons is directly linked to positioning by the Indian 
government to convince the United States that there is such a thing as a "peaceful" nuclear 
explosion. Nehru was able to maintain this apparent contradiction through noting that: 
On the one hand, the nuclear bomb and the destruction of Nagasaki and 
Hiroshima illustrates the horrendous revolution that has taken place in military 
technology and on the other, the application of nuclear energy to peaceful and 
constructive purposes has opened limitless possibilities for human development, 
prosperity and overabundance. This major challenge confronts our times with a 
choice between co-destruction and co-prosperity and makes it imperative for the 
world to outlaw war, particularly nuclear war.
223
 
 
 American nuclear policy toward India was one of close cooperation  through the 
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, as long as it was possible for US policymakers to 
accept the Indian distinction between "peaceful" and "military" nuclear development. Even when 
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American involvement tapered off  due to strained bilateral relations, as the dangers of dual-use 
technology and Indian hesitation to accept international controls grew, the US continued to be 
unaware of India’s progress and was utterly surprised by the 18 May 1974 "Smiling Buddha" 
detonation. 
 If Nehru provided the political push for weapons development, then the development of 
Indian nuclear expertise and infrastructure must be attributed to an extraordinary scientific 
figure: Homi Bhabha. Born to a wealthy Parsi family and related to the preeminent Tata 
industrialist family through his aunt, Bhabha earned a doctorate in physics from Cambridge in 
1935 and mixed during the pre-war years with leading nuclear scientists such as Niels Bohr, 
James Franck, and Enrico Fermi, who later would be key figures in the Manhattan Project.
224
 
After returning to India, he headed the generously-funded Tata Institute for Fundamental 
Research (TIFR) in 1945 Bhabha frequently referred to the TIFR as "the cradle of the Indian 
atomic energy programme."
225
  
 Bhabha, the patriotic scientist, had an excellent relationship with Nehru, the nationalist 
politician, whom he had known since 1937. They both envisioned an India shaking off its stunted 
scientific legacy from the time of the Raj and pursuing the leading technology of the post-war 
period—atomic energy. Nehru introduced an Atomic Energy Act in 1948 to the Constituent 
Assembly—the body responsible for writing the Republic’s constitution and India’s de facto 
legislature until the first official elections in1952.
226
 The legislation would create an Atomic 
Energy Commission with secrecy controls over both military and civilian nuclear research even 
stricter than those of Britain and the United States. The following exchange between Nehru’s 
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fellow Congress Party member and critic of the bill’s secrecy provisions, S.V. Krishnamurthy 
Rao, and the prime minister is telling of Indian nuclear policy: 
Rao:   May I know if secrecy is insisted upon even for research for  
  peaceful purposes? 
 
Nehru:  Not for theoretical research. Secrecy comes in when you think in  
  terms of the production or use of atomic energy. That is the central  
  effort to produce atomic energy. 
  
Rao:   In the Bill passed in the United Kingdom secrecy is restricted only 
  for defense purposes. 
 
Nehru:  I do not know how you are to distinguish between the two.
227
 
 
This shows that Nehru was keenly aware of the dual-use potential of nuclear infrastructure and 
was determined to wrap as thick a coat of security around a "peaceful" atomic energy program as 
one might expect for a military research. The bill passed and Bhabha was appointed as one 
member of the Commission’s triumvirate under the direct supervision of the prime minister. The 
Indian AEC was established on 10 April 1948 and took the lion’s share of the Republic’s 
scientific research and development budget with little government oversight.
228
 
 As discussed above, India’s atomic energy program was strongly tied to nationalist 
ideological notions of self-sufficiency, modernity, and anti-imperialism. The 1946 Baruch Plan 
backed by the US in the United Nations clashed with both Indian ideological and material 
interests. The Plan’s provision for international control of fissile material through an Atomic 
Development Authority was viewed by Nehru as a dire threat to India’s modernization and 
independence.
229
 As a country poor in fossil fuels, India could not afford to sacrifice control over 
its plentiful fissile ores such as thorium, which not only would help in the development of a 
domestic atomic power grid, but also would serves as a valuable commodity for international 
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trade. Nehru’s sister and representative at the UN, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, asserted that the Baruch 
Plan would create a two-tiered international nuclear order that would allow the superpowers to 
exploit the resources of India while denying it the benefit of atomic energy. Nehru, though 
consistently in favor of global nuclear disarmament in public, must have been pleased to see the 
Plan stagnate in the Security Council. 
 India’s program continued to move from theoretical research to practical application 
when it signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with the French government in 1951.
230
 Nehru 
continued to provide robust governmental support of Bhabha’s programs through a four year 
plan unveiled in 1952, which funded a nation-wide geological survey of fissile ore reserves and 
the extraction of thorium from monazite.
231
 Bhabha also secretly began side deals with atomic 
scientists in Great Britain, Canada, and the United States to obtain technical knowledge and 
blueprints in exchange for Indian fissile ores needed to produce thorium and beryllium.
232
 
 However, a diplomatic confrontation arose with the United States when an Indian public 
company sought to load a Polish vessel with thorium nitrate for sale in China in July 1953. 
Thorium nitrate is vital for nuclear fuel and its transfer to China ran afoul the US Mutual 
Defense Assistance Act of 1951, which legislated cutting all forms of aid to non-aligned 
countries that traded strategic materials to the communist bloc.
233
 When the US Ambassador to 
India, George V. Allen, informed Nehru of this development, the prime minister insisted that any 
American pressure to cancel the shipment was a violation of Indian sovereignty. The situation 
was resolved after Secretary of State John Foster Dulles offered a compromise wherein the 
Indian government would declare that it was unaware of the Act and that the thorium nitrate 
                                                 
230
 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 22. 
231
 Shyam Bhatia, India’s Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), 88. 
232
 Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State (London: Zed 
Books, 1998), 78-81. 
233
 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 22. 
[66] 
 
would be used for commercial, not strategic, purposes in China. Although the episode was 
resolved fairly quickly through deft skirting of American legislation, the US-India interaction is 
telling. The Indian government under Nehru and his successor, Indira Gandhi, would repeatedly 
refuse to compromise its sovereignty by yielding to international controls of nuclear technology 
and materials. Two other developments during the Eisenhower administration would further 
strain Indian relations with the US and had a significant effect on the weapons program: the 
American alliance with Pakistan and the Atoms for Peace program.  
 The American alliance with Pakistan in 1954 and accompanied military aid package was 
viewed by Nehru as a major obstacle to friendly and cooperative Indo-American relations. This 
cooling over perceived slights to Indian independence in foreign affairs is reflected in Nehru’s 
declaration on 1 March 1954 that "India has no intention of surrendering or bartering her 
freedom for any purpose or under any compulsion whatever."
234
 He also announced his rejection 
of an American offer of military aid similar to that extended to Pakistan. The statement not only 
indicates that Nehru and his government took the realignment in South Asia’s security 
constellation seriously, but also that they considered short- to medium-term military gain 
insufficient reason to abrogate India’s sovereignty. 
 The independent streak predominant in Indian foreign policy also led Nehru to reject the 
benefits of internationally-backed civilian nuclear infrastructure development as envisioned by 
the Atoms for Peace program. As noted above, the Atoms for Peace program was designed to 
limit weapons development through deposition of fissile material with the IAEA, which in turn 
would distribute that material for civilian purposes as it saw fit. This proposal ran counter to two 
of Nehru’s foreign policy goals: preservation of Indian sovereignty, particularly in matters of 
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weapons development, and the development of a peace-oriented bloc not aligned with either the 
hegemony of the United States or the Soviet Union. In a speech before the Lok Sabha, or lower 
house of India’s Parliament, on 10 May 1954, Nehru attacked the Atoms for Peace initiative. 
Although he clearly saw the value in controlling and banning nuclear weapons, he argued that 
there were major questions of enforcement, stating that "they cannot be controlled by a mere 
desire or demand for banning them."
235
 He clearly had China and its nascent weapons program in 
mind when he asserted that the United Nations and therefore the IAEA "cannot control any 
nation which is not in it, which it refuses to admit and with which it would not have anything to 
do." He also was skeptical of the proposed IAEA’s ability to resist pressure from established 
great powers to restrict nuclear programs in the developing world while collecting their fissile 
resources, a prospect which resonated with his memory of India’s colonial past. To this end, 
India’s UN representative, V.K. Krishna Menon submitted an amendment to the draft statute for 
the IAEA that gave non-nuclear nations a significant role in the writing of the Agency’s rules 
and constitution as well as provisions to prevent exploitation of countries rich in fissile materials 
at the hands of more-developed nations.
236
 
 The United States backed down in the face of pressure from non-nuclear nations such as 
France and India on the topic of substantive international controls of nuclear energy. Strauss, 
Eisenhower’s Chairman of the AEC, argued against the political feasibility of strict inspections 
and the Pentagon expressed wariness at the prospect of similar inspections of American nuclear 
sites.
237
 Secretary of State Dulles argued against the feasibility of a non-proliferation program 
with a robust inspections system, as "it would be difficult for nations to forego permanently their 
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right to make nuclear weapons while the U.S., USSR, and U.K. continued to make them."
238
 This 
was precisely the point raised by the Manhattan Project scientists’ Committee on Political and 
Social Problems in 1945. As noted above, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union 
enjoyed a significant advantage in atomic matters, which could have theoretically been used to 
impose conditions on offers of nuclear aid. However, similar to the Israeli case, bilateral and 
international political obstacles discouraged American policymakers from exercising this 
leverage and encouraged the United States to cooperate with India on nuclear matters, which 
gave the Indian government time to present the world with a fait accompli. 
 Similar to the Israeli Dimona site’s ostensible classification as a "research" reactor, the 
United States and its allies failed to recognize the military applications of civilian nuclear 
technology in India. Nuclear power’s strongest advocate, Bhabha, argued that India’s lack of 
conventional power sources necessitated production of atomic energy, which was the only way 
of bringing up the living standard to American levels.
239
 As India lacked the capacity to process 
uranium ore, he favored acquiring technology for the processing of plutonium, which could in 
turn produce the necessary U-233 isotope and therefore an endless supply of fuel for other 
reactors. However, plutonium could also be used in weapons production. This proposal for a 
sophisticated atomic energy grid presented existing nuclear powers with significant business 
incentives for cooperation as potential suppliers of equipment and know-how. Construction for 
India’s first research reactor began at Apsara in 1955 with British engineering designs and went 
critical in 1956 with British uranium. The site near Trombay, which produced the plutonium for 
the Smiling Buddha test, was called the "Canadian-Indian Reactor, U.S." (CIRUS), as it was 
financed in part by the Canadian government as part of the anti-communist Colombo Plan. 
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According to an Indian scientist responsible for the construction of the Apsara site, A. Sambasiva 
Rao, there was "no other great need to go in for plutonium production so urgently except for 
India’s hidden goal."240 In order to make the sale, the Canadian government imposed no strict 
safeguards or inspection requirements on the Indian government in exchange for the necessary 
financial and technical support, apart from a secret annex in their agreement. This annex only 
stipulated a verbal commitment from the Indian government that the resultant plutonium would 
be used exclusively for "peaceful purposes."
241
 However, in July 1958, Nehru approved a project 
code-named "Phoenix" to build a plutonium reprocessing plant on the Trombay site by mid-1964 
capable of annually producing ten  kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium—the explosive 
equivalent of the Hiroshima bomb.
242
 
 Although Canada and Great Britain supplied most of the plutonium and designs 
necessary for the development of a national nuclear infrastructure in India, the contributions of 
the United States are also significant. In the interest of international cooperation on civilian 
nuclear matters, the American government declassified and disseminated thousands of technical 
documents in 1955, including those related to plutonium reprocessing, for foreign scientists and 
engineers.
243
 During that year, members of the congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
visited India to encourage the purchase of American nuclear technology and indeed offered to 
supply the CIRUS reactor with heavy water if Indian stocks were unreliable. Between 1955 and 
the 1974 explosion, 1,104 Indian nuclear scientists and engineers were welcomed to the Argonne 
Laboratory School of Nuclear Science and Engineering in Illinois and other American facilities 
for the purpose of research. Although this aid would directly contribute to India’s ability to 
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initiate a weapons development program, few American policymakers were willing to sacrifice 
the US’s profitable role as supplier of nuclear technology. Strauss implied this strongly in a letter 
to Eisenhower dated 10 August 1956, in which he noted that Bhabha viewed safeguard proposals 
as "more or less of an insult to India’s peaceful intentions."244 
 American policymakers had very little reason to suspect the sincerity of India’s nuclear 
intentions. A 1958 assessment by the CIA’s Office of Scientific Intelligence determined that 
India’s nuclear program was peaceful in nature on the basis of Nehru’s public statements and 
closed with the assertion that "there is no indication in government or scientific circles of a 
change from the traditional Indian pattern of passivity and mediation."
245
 This cultural 
assumption within the intelligence community tainted analysis by discounting the allure of a 
weapons program. Nehru catered to this assumption when he declared publicly on 20 January 
1957 that "whatever the circumstances, we shall never use this atomic energy for evil purposes. 
There is no condition attached."
246
 However, there is some evidence to suggest that the pursuit of 
a clear weapon-grade explosive capability—in comparison to a physical warhead capable of 
delivery—was indeed a goal for Nehru. In 1960, Major General (ret.) Kenneth D. Nichols, who 
oversaw the design, construction, and operation of Manhattan Project plutonium plants, visited 
India in his capacity as a consultant to Westinghouse to convince Nehru and Bhabha to consider 
the purchase of American reactors.
247
 After Nehru opened up bidding to American producers, 
Nichols recorded the following conversation in his memoirs: 
[Nehru asked] "Can you build an atomic bomb?" Bhabha assured him that he 
could and in reply to Nehru’s next question about time he estimated that he would 
need about a year to do it. I was really astounded to be hearing these questions 
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from the one I thought to be on e of the world’s most peace-loving leaders. He 
then asked me if I agreed with Bhabha, and I replied that I knew of no reason why 
Bhabha could not do it. He had men who were as qualified or more qualified than 
our young scientists were fifteen years earlier. He concluded by saying to Bhabha, 
"Well, don’t do it until I tell you to."248 
 
There is no record of this conversation reaching the attention of American intelligence officials 
or policymakers. 
 The late 1950s and early 1960s saw a major realignment in American South Asia policy 
which made nuclear restrictions to hot of an issue to broach. It started with Eisenhower’s 
disenchantment with Pakistan. He called the alliance "the worst kind of a plan and a decision we 
could have made. It was a terrible error, but we now seemed hopelessly involved in it."
249
 In 
order to signal India that the United States was not unconditionally backing Pakistan, the 
Eisenhower administration decided to "actively encourage India to [consider] U.S. Offers for 
bilateral assistance in the atomic reactor field…" particularly through declassifying "considerable 
information about power reactors."
250
 Pro-India legislators, including John F. Kennedy, backed 
the Eisenhower administration in raising the amount of economic aid for India from $400 million 
in 1957 to $822 million in 1960, at the behest of the Conference on India and the United States, 
an incipient "Indian lobby."
251
 
 The Kennedy administration sought to build on this relationship in order to balance the 
growth of Communist Chinese power in southern Asia. George McGhee, Chairman of the State 
Department’s Policy Planning Council, wrote a memo on 13 September 1961 advocating that the 
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United States preempt a Chinese detonation by supporting an Indian nuclear test.
252
 McGhee 
argued: "while we would like to limit the number of nuclear powers, so long as we lack the 
capability to do so we ought to prefer that the first Asian one be India and not China."
253
 
McGhee conceded in the memo that the US Ambassador to New Delhi, John Kenneth Galbraith, 
was "strongly opposed" to his plan and considered "the chances [of Nehru’s collaboration] are 
roughly only one out of fifty."
254
 Galbraith’s assessment seems to be predicated on Nehru’s anti-
nuclear public posturing. In any case, Rusk rejected the proposal, stating that he was "not 
convinced we should depart from our stated policy that we are opposed to the further extension 
of national nuclear weapons capability."
255
 The McGhee memo reveals that choosing 
geopolitical advantage over non-proliferation was not unthinkable in the Kennedy-era State 
Department; its rejection reveals that the Department’s head, Rusk, was firmly committed to 
combating the spread of nuclear weapons. 
 The memo also reveals the central role of China in India’s nuclear decision-making. The 
intelligence community produced a NIE on 21 September 1961 concerning the nuclear weapons 
and delivery capabilities of countries other than the United States and the United Kingdom.
256
 In 
the section devoted to India, the estimate states: 
The explosion of a nuclear device by Communist China would greatly strengthen 
the view in India, particularly in conservative and military circles, that there is a 
pressing need for an Indian nuclear capability if India is to avoid either bending to 
Communist Chinese pressure or being forced into a position of outright 
dependence on Western external support.
257
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The report even noted that the construction of the "Phoenix" plutonium separation plant at the 
CIRUS reactor near Trombay was likely intended to free India from foreign uranium sources and 
dodge the accompanied "restrictions regarding the use of this reactor and the disposition of its 
fuel." However, the estimate concluded that weapons development was unlikely given that "the 
psychological and political factors opposing any nuclear weapons program continue to be strong 
in India."
258
 This estimate, though possessing solid information on India’s nuclear infrastructure, 
reveals that the intelligence community was not as adept at gauging pro-bomb pressures in India 
politics. Although the accuracy of this estimate could be examined by a historian, its significance 
lies in its conclusions’ presumed mollifying effect on policymakers who were unwilling to push 
the Indians on nuclear matters for other reasons in the first place. There was no need to insist on 
inspections of or international trade restrictions on civilian atomic power facilities if the 
eventuality of an Indian nuclear detonation seemed unlikely. 
 However, China continued to play a central role in Indian nuclear policy. In November 
1962, Chinese troops invaded India to resolve a border dispute in the Himalayas. 
The Kennedy administration, far from using the shock of India’s defeat as an opportunity to win 
goodwill with Nehru and his government, offered a relatively small military aid package of $120 
million in conjunction with the United Kingdom.
259
 This incident, following a disastrous state 
visit by Nehru in 1961, an awkward confrontation over the expulsion of Portuguese settlers from 
Goa, and the purchase of Soviet MiG-21 fighters all led to a significant cooling in Indo-
American relations and ended the possibility of realignment that began with Eisenhower. 
 Despite this straining of relations, the United States concluded negotiations with the 
Indian government on 8 August 1963 to construct a number of reactors near Tarapur for the 
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production of nuclear energy.
260
 The Tarapur agreement came with a number of restrictions, 
particularly that it only could make use of American-supplied uranium and that all equipment, 
technology, and fuel be devoted "solely for peaceful purposes."
261
 Should this and other 
provisions not be met, the United States could demand the return of all equipment and fissile 
material. The agreement also provided for a transfer of inspection responsibility to the IAEA "as 
soon as practicable." The Tarapur deal engendered a legislative backlash in both India and the 
United States. A number of Indian critics claimed that the deal compromised the nation’s 
sovereignty through dependence on the United States for fuel, though the restrictions only 
applied to the Tarapur plant. 
 Kennedy’s final major effort on behalf of non-proliferation prior to his assassination on 
22 November 1963 was the Limited Test Ban Treaty. For India, it presented the opportunity to 
move in the seemingly-contradictory directions of global nuclear disarmament and a weapons 
development program. Nehru hailed the LTBT as a "watershed" that would lead to "disarmament 
and peace."
262
 However, the treaty did not ban underground tests, such as the 1974 Pokhran test. 
By Kennedy’s death, India had made rapid advances in laying the groundwork for a domestic 
nuclear infrastructure which could be used for the production of atomic weaponry. Kennedy and 
other policymakers continued Eisenhower’s policy of extending technological aid to India for 
both commercial and political gain, though competition with other supplier countries made it 
difficult to impose any serious form of inspections or regulations on the Indian nuclear program. 
This passive approach to the possibility of an Indian nuclear weapons program was continually 
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supported by the intelligence community, which concluded in June 1963 that "it is unlikely that 
such a program will be authorized so long as Nehru remains in power."
263
  
 The administration of Lyndon Johnson increased American determination to impose 
international controls on the Indian weapons program. However, by that time, India had the 
necessary infrastructure to move toward the construction of an atomic explosive and began 
moving in that direction. Bhabha presented a paper at the Pugwash Conference on Science and 
World Affairs in late January to early February 1964 revealing his plans to use civilian 
technology for weapons development. In this paper, he noted the geopolitical advantages to be 
gained from an atomic bomb: 
 Nuclear weapons coupled with an adequate delivery system can enable a State to 
acquire the capacity to destroy more or less totally the cities, industry, and all 
important targets in another State… With the help of nuclear weapons, therefore, 
a State can acquire what we may call a position of absolute deterrence even 
against another having a many times greater destructive power under its 
control.
264
 
 
Clearly Bhabha had China in mind when he presented this paper. He suggested that Indian 
policymakers use the possibility of weapons development to extract a security guarantee either 
from the United States or the Soviet Union. Bhabha’s paper also suggested using IAEA heavy 
water and fissile material for civilian power plants to free uncontrolled material for weapons 
development, which was the strategy used to produce the Pokhran device.
265
 This strategy would 
be adopted by the post-Nehru and Bhabha generation of scientists, diplomats, and politicians. 
Also attending the conference were future prime minister Indira Gandhi, Bhabha’s successor at 
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the Indian AEC, Vikram Sarabhai, and V.C. Trivedi, lead negotiator at the US-sponsored Non-
Proliferation Treaty talks. 
 After years of American inaction bolstered by the assumption that the Indian government 
would stick to its "traditional" disavowal of nuclear weapons, the US intelligence community 
began to realize that the speed and relative autonomy of India’s nuclear infrastructure could 
easily be converted to military use. Thomas L. Hughes, Kennedy and Johnson’s Assistant 
Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, wrote a letter to John McCone, the Director of 
Central Intelligence, requesting an update to NIE 4-63 given new information on the Israeli and 
Indian programs.
266
 Two reference questions from the letter reflect a new attention to the perils 
of dual-use technology and are particularly applicable to the Indian case: 
1.  What countries now have an adequate technological and scientific base for 
 the development before 1970 of a nuclear weapon and what are their 
 intentions in this regard? 
… 
5.    Is clandestine weapon development a realistic possibility over the next 
 five years?
267
 
 
The new estimate, NIE 4-2-64, examined India’s nuclear program in much greater detail with 
extended sections on technical capabilities and the political factors surrounding development 
decisions.
268
 This was due in part to the Chinese nuclear test of 16 October 1964, which was 
cited previously by intelligence officials as a potential catalyst for an Indian weapons program. 
This estimate noted that India had all the basic facilities necessary to produce plutonium for 
weapons development. The CIRUS site in particular turned out sufficient fissile material for "one 
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or two weapons in the 20 [kiloton] range."
269
 Existing safeguards on fissile material and heavy 
water were considered by the estimate to be not enough to "hinder the Indians from embarking 
on a weapons program."
270
 As such, the Indian government could "move into a modest weapons 
program with little delay and moderate expense."
271
 Although the estimate noted that India had a 
strong traditional opposition to nuclear weapons for moral and political reasons, it asserted that 
the Chinese test meant that pro-nuclear arguments would likely gain sway in the government. 
 The CIA’s analysis of India’s political situation in NIE 4-2-64 was accurate, perhaps the 
most accurate of all subsequent estimates prior to the Smiling Buddha test. Nehru’s successor, 
Lal Bahadur Shastri, was a few months into his term of office and declared: 
 China has been trying to build herself up as a mighty war machine. The atom 
bomb is the latest type of weapon which cuts across the general desire of 
humanity to live in peace. It is a danger and a menace to mankind. I do hope the 
voice of peace-loving people in all the countries of the world will be raised 
against it and the world conscience awakened to fight this aggression against 
peace and security.
272
 
 
However, eight days after the test, Bhabha went on All India Radio and publicly argued in favor 
of a weapons program, using the argument from his Pugwash Conference article, namely, that 
nuclear weapons were affordable and an excellent way of maintaining a state’s sovereignty.273 Of 
course, his statement was moderated with the suggestion that weapons development was 
unnecessary should the United Nations produce a realistic plan for global disarmament. As NIE 
4-2-64 predicted, Shastri came under pressure from right-wingers both within and without his 
government. On 25 October 1964, Mushtaq Ahmed, president of the Congress Party committee 
representing New Delhi, declared "the only course for India is to produce her own atom bomb to 
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defend herself."
274
 The Organizer, the weekly magazine of the conservative and Hindu-
nationalist Bharatiya Jana Sangh Party (BJS), attacked Shastri for refusing to commit to the 
construction of a nuclear bomb: 
The eunuch Government decided years ago in its ahimsic [non-violent] idiocy to 
spend crores [South Asian numbering unit meaning ten million] on nuclear power 
but not to use the same crores on developing the nuclear bomb. We had the 
chance to do it before China did it and so we could tell that we meant business 
and that we were ahead of China. In our criminal folly we missed it.
275
 
 
The Chinese explosion, compounded with a severe food crisis, increasingly placed pressure on 
Shastri to pursue a nuclear bomb, cut spending on conventional armaments, and devote 
additional funds to alleviate hunger. B.K. Nehru, the Indian Ambassador to the United States, 
called William C. Foster, head of the ACDA, to inform him that the Shastri was still opposed to 
nuclear weapons, but that the Chinese test was "seriously degrading India’s position in the Far 
East" and that continued opposition may have become "politically impossible."
276
 Foster then 
floated the possibility of an American security guarantee in exchange for continued Indian 
nuclear abstinence and support for non-proliferation in the General Assembly. The Ambassador 
demurred, stating that India’s non-alignment policy would not allow any sort of formal 
agreement with the United States.
277
 
 Shortly before Nehru’s phone call with Foster, the US Embassy in New Delhi received a 
tip from an Indian official in the Ministry of External Affairs that Shastri had already authorized 
Bhabha to "come up with [an] estimate of what was involved in India’s attempting an 
underground ‘explosion’."278 On the 23rd and 24th of November, the Lok Sabha debated the 
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merits of a nuclear weapons program, with most attention being paid to its cost (Bhabha’s 
estimate was inaccurately low), necessity (given the possibility of a US security guarantee), and 
morality.
279
 Shastri ended the debate on Indian foreign policy on the 24
th
 by arguing that his anti-
nuclear stance was not "deep-rooted" and open for adjustment based on India’s new strategic 
situation, a significant shift from Gandhi’s actual and Nehru’s perceived opposition to the 
bomb.
280
 Indeed, Shastri cited potential civilian uses of nuclear devices, such as digging "big 
tunnels", clearing "huge areas", and wiping out mountains for development parks.
281
 He argued 
that nuclear weapons were acceptable within the context of India’s morally-charged foreign 
policy: 
…in this context if it is required to use nuclear devices for the good of the country 
as well as for the good of the world, so then our Atomic Energy Commission is 
pursuing these same objectives.
282
 
 
Although neither the US Embassy nor the intelligence community noticed that Shastri’s speech 
sanctioned the development of nuclear explosives, the headlines of leading Indian newspapers, 
including the Times of India, the Hindustan Times, and the National Herald all had headlines 
interpreting the debate as a refusal to depart from existing non-nuclear policy.
283
 
 The CIA produced an estimate on "The Prospects for India" on 10 December 1964.
284
 A 
full section is devoted to the nuclear program and noted that the Indian government had fulfilled 
all the necessary technical requirements for weapons production. The estimate also noted for the 
first time that Shastri was experiencing "considerable domestic pressure" to pursue an atomic 
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bomb.
285
 The CIA recognized that Indian weapons development was a distinct possibility given 
that the necessary constellation of both material and political factors was present for the first 
time. 
 In order to cope with the "nuclear problem," Undersecretary of State George W. Ball 
instructed the US Embassy in New Delhi to stroke Indian pride by emphasizing that the United 
States was "impressed by Indian achievements of science and technology which we believe 
exceed those by Communist China."
286
 However, Ball suggested that Ambassador Chester 
Bowles should not extend any form of security guarantee beyond the broad assurance against 
"nuclear blackmail" offered by Johnson in his public statement on the Chinese test.
287
 Ball’s 
instructions suggest that he assumed that the shock from the Chinese explosion was one to Indian 
prestige, rather than security. He also suggested in the telegram that "developing one or more 
ventures in fields peaceful uses nuclear energy and space technology that would serve highlight 
India's capabilities." 
 Shastri’s suggestion that India pursue "peaceful" nuclear explosives was considered a 
feasible field of cooperation by American policymakers. Indian journalist Raj Chengappa asserts 
that Bhabha contacted his American counterparts in 1965 for assistance with the construction of 
a Ploughshare-type nuclear explosive, though his FOIA sources are not cited.
288
 Some evidence 
of US-India cooperation on nuclear explosives can be found in a November 1964 AEC 
"discussion paper." This paper reveals that the AEC continued to underestimate the pressure on 
Shastri to pursue weapons development: 
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There has been a great deal of speculation (due to remarks made by Dr. Bhabha) 
that India might elect [to] embark on Plowshare device development program as a 
"Cover" and rationalization for a nuclear weapons program. This appears to be a 
highly remote possibility due to technical and economic considerations as well as 
recent statements made by Mr. Shastri disavowing any intention on the part of the 
Indian Government to embark on a nuclear weapons program.
289
 
 
Strangely, the discussion paper concluded that American-conducted PNEs could remove the 
Indian government’s incentive for building atomic bombs of their own. This finding failed to 
take into account the variety of pressures on Shastri by exclusively focusing on the supposed 
engineering benefits of Ploughshare detonations, rather than security concerns and national 
prestige. It also underestimated the strength of Shastri and the Congress Party’s non-aligned 
foreign policy by assuming that they would consent to Americans detonating nuclear devices on 
Indian soil for any reason. 
 By 1965, international efforts to cope with nuclear proliferation presented the Shastri 
government with the opportunity to retain its traditional anti-nuclear policy while negating the 
threat from China. On May 4
th, India’s representative to the 114-member UN Disarmament 
Commission, B.B. Chakravarty, offered five conditions he considered necessary for an effective 
non-proliferation treaty.
290
 These included: pledges from "nuclear powers" to not transfer 
weapons to or use weapons on non-nuclear states, a UN security guarantee against "nuclear 
blackmail," "tangible progress toward disarmament, including a comprehensive test ban treaty, a 
complete freeze on the production of nuclear weapons and means of delivery, as well as 
substantial reduction in the existing stocks," and finally, a commitment from non-nuclear powers 
[i.e. Pakistan] to not manufacture or acquire atomic weaponry. This vision of the non-
proliferation treaty would have covered India’s security needs vis-à-vis China and Pakistan. Had 
it been adopted by the international community, it would have been burnished India’s—and 
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therefore Shastri’s—standing among non-aligned and non-nuclear countries. However, 
differences between the American, Soviet, and non-aligned blocs on the issues of nuclear 
transfers and which parties—nuclear or non-nuclear—should make the first concessions drove 
negotiations into deadlock until 1967. Ambassador Bowles asserted that: 
India and those other non-nuclear powers which are now in position to make 
bomb cannot over period of time be diverted from produced nuclear weapons by 
moral exhortations and lectures from members of present nuclear club. Therefore 
certain amount of give as well as take is essential if we are to cope effectively 
with this critical situation.
291
 
 
 The divide between the "nuclear club" and India became even clearer after a series of 
border skirmishes escalated to war with Pakistan by September 1965. China took advantage of 
the war to supply Pakistan with arms and issue India an ultimatum demanding that India 
withdraw from the Tibetan border or face "grave consequences."
292
 This was precisely the form 
of nuclear blackmail from an enemy that India sought to avoid. Johnson wrote in his memoirs 
that the 1965 war raised "grave doubts about military assistance" to both Pakistan and India in 
the minds of American policymakers.
293
 The United States cut aid from both Pakistan and India 
during the war to push them to accept a UN-brokered cease-fire, but this further alienated the 
feasibility of a security guarantee for India. For Indian political elites, the war with Pakistan and 
China’s meddling discredited the pursuit of international controls and contributed to the case for 
weapons development. 
 The American intelligence community realized this and produced a special estimate on 
India’s nuclear weapons policy. This estimate concluded that "within the next few years India 
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probably will detonate a nuclear device and proceed to develop nuclear weapons."
294
 It noted that 
the Indian program had all the technical capabilities necessary for a "modest weapons program" 
and that the Shastri government had "little success in finding non-nuclear ways to deal with the 
threat which Chinese nuclear developments pose to its prestige and security."
295
 This intelligence 
estimate indicates that American intelligence officials recognized that all the necessary technical 
factors and political pressures were in place for India to initiate a weapons program. 
 The Indian nuclear program experienced the dual shocks of Shastri’s death by a heart 
attack on 10 January 1966 and the loss of Homi Bhabha in a plane crash on the 24
th
. The new 
Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, appointed Vikram Sarabhai, a Cambridge-educated physicist to 
head the Indian AEC. Sarabhai was considered by pro-bomb scientists to be "sheltered" and a 
"peculiar fellow" for holding a staunch Gandhian pacifist stance toward atomic weaponry.
296
 
India’s representative at the non-proliferation treaty conference at Geneva, V.C. Trivedi, 
continued to attack the American position as overly-slanted toward existing nuclear states by 
construing the "tangible progress toward disarmament" clause to mean universal and sudden 
abolition of nuclear arms. Trivedi argued that that real progress would encompass a nuclear 
weapons and delivery system production freeze, which was considered feasible by the United 
States.
297
 Secretary of State Rusk admitted in testimony before the Senate in February 1966 that 
the American approach to non-proliferation was overly weighted in favor of existing nuclear 
powers.
298
 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara argued, to no avail, that the United States 
accept the logic that India had good reason to pursue nuclear weaponry and attempt to make 
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concessions to Indian security and pride. This logic can be found in a memo Rusk sent to 
Johnson to prepare for Indira Gandhi’s visit to the United States: 
I believe that we should, therefore, attempt to head off an Indian decision to 
produce nuclear weapons. To do so, we might in time have to be more responsive 
to Indian security needs, preferably in some way that will minimize our own 
commitment.
 299
 
  
However, Rusk argued that no security guarantees or aid should be extended in the short term to 
avoid antagonizing India’s rivals, presumably Pakistan: 
… we must recognize that this response would almost certainly involve an 
increased and more specific US commitment in the subcontinent and would entail 
important costs in terms of probable reactions of other states. 
 
This memo reveals that Rusk was willing to subordinate bilateral efforts to stem nuclear 
proliferation to broader security issues in South Asia. This does not mean that Rusk and Johnson 
disregarded the Indian case; his memo merely noted that there were very few bilateral solutions 
considered palatable to both sides. The memo advised Johnson to inform Gandhi that he 
generally agreed with the concept of security guarantees for non-nuclear countries. In short, 
Rusk and Johnson were counting on a satisfactory international settlement at Geneva to dissipate 
pro-bomb pressures on the Indian government. 
 However, China conducted its third nuclear test on 9 May 1966, which prompted uproar 
in the Lok Sabha. Indira Gandhi robustly argued in favor the long-standing government policy of 
building up India’s nuclear infrastructure instead of construction an actual weapon, but 
quixotically asserted that "in the mean time we are increasing our know-how and other 
competence."
300
 The Congress Party lost eighty three seats in the Lok Sabha elections during the 
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spring of 1967, which further weakened Gandhi’s position.301 Out of desperation, she dispatched 
her secretary, L.K. Jha and Sarabhai to the United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britain in 
April 1967 to extract security guarantees from those nations and end the nuclear question in 
India. This venture was ultimately unsuccessful, which discredited Sarabhai and led Gandhi to 
replace Jha with a pro-bomb AEC member, Parmeshwar Narain Haksar, as her personal 
secretary. In August 1967, shortly after the arrival of Haksar, Gandhi cleared renewed theoretical 
research on nuclear explosives at the Trombay site, which was renamed that Bhabha Atomic 
Research Centre (BARC), and ordered Sarabhai to not interfere.
302
 
 Meanwhile, the American negotiators at Geneva continued to be endorse the existing 
advantages of by the "nuclear club" through making little concessions to the autonomy of non-
nuclear powers. It became clear that no major power would offer security guarantees against 
nuclear blackmail. Johnson further alienated Indian support in a personal message read aloud by 
Foster to the ENDC at Geneva that declared: 
I am sure we all agree that a nonproliferation treaty should not contain any 
provisions that would defeat its major purpose. The treaty must, therefore, cover 
nuclear explosive devices for peaceful as well as military purposes. The 
technology is the same. A peaceful nuclear explosive device would, in effect, also 
be a highly sophisticated weapon.
303
 
 
This position on PNEs, though logical, and the absence of any sort of nuclear umbrella for non-
nuclear states, ran directly contrary to the Indian vision of non-proliferation and scuppered any 
chance of Gandhi’s support. India’s representative, Trivedi, condemned the American approach 
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as "nuclear apartheid" and counseled against ratification.
304
 When the NPT was opened for 
signatures in July 1968, India did not sign.
305
 
 Indira Gandhi’s refusal to submit the NPT for ratification was a major sticking point in 
US-India relations at the end of the Johnson administration. The President delayed a desperately-
needed $225 million Agency for International Development (AID) loan to India. Walt W. 
Rostow, Johnson’s National Security Advisor, argued that the delay was necessary in order to 
"find ways to use the loan as political leverage with Mrs. Gandhi and to impress on her how 
painful it is to get these large sums for a country that isn't always as helpful as we could wish."
306
 
Rostow argued that Johnson could try to "subtly to tie this loan to the Treaty," but noted that 
strong-arming the Indian government could change their tacit opposition to open lobbying 
against it with the non-aligned bloc in the UN.
307
 Concluding that there was little to gain from 
continually withholding the loan, Rostow urged Johnson to release the funds. 
 The NPT did not provide sufficient safeguards for non-nuclear nations and the United 
States was unwilling to severely damage bilateral relations with India for the sake of its 
ratification. The absence of effective international counter-proliferation initiatives and bilateral 
security guarantees combined with a strong civilian nuclear infrastructure and continued 
domestic pressures for weapons development all contributed directly to Gandhi’s decision to 
build a bomb. 
 Johnson and Rostow’s successors, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, respectively, 
worsened relations with India and made no effort to check its weapons development program. 
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The men had terrible personal relations with Indira Gandhi and were decidedly pro-Pakistan. 
They referred to Indians as "slippery, treacherous people," "arrogant bastards," and simply, 
"goddamn Indians."
308
 In taped Oval Office conversations, Nixon also referred to Gandhi as a 
"bitch," "whore," and "old witch." Upon arriving in Lahore, Pakistan, Nixon assured dictator 
Yahya Khan and the assembled crowd that he came "not just as the political leader, the head of 
state of my country," but also as a "friend of Pakistan."
309
 
 In addition to his personal dislike of Gandhi and India, Nixon’s foreign policy made 
cooperation on nuclear issues even more unlikely. His flirtation with India’s foe, China, drove 
Gandhi to sign the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with the Soviet Union on 9 
August 1971.
310
 Although this treaty was nothing close to an alliance, it was enough for the 
Nixon and Kissinger to suspect Gandhi was acting as a cat’s-paw for Moscow when it intervened 
in the East Pakistan Crisis. The following telephone exchange between Kissinger and Nixon’s 
Secretary of the Treasury, John Connally, is telling: 
Kissinger:  Now the argument that State is making is doesn't make any difference 
anyway, it's too late. Secondly, we will just drive the Indians into the Soviet arms 
if we get tough. 
 
Connally: …them I'd like to. Go ahead. 
 
Kissinger: (laughter) Well, you're talking my language. The thing that concerns 
the President and me is this; here we have Indian-Soviet collusion, raping a friend 
of ours. Secondly, we have a situation where one of the motives that the Chinese 
may have had in leaning towards us a little bit is the fear that something like this 
might happen to them.
311
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When the crisis in Bangladesh erupted into open war, Nixon deployed the nuclear aircraft carrier 
USS Enterprise and nine other warships to the Bay of Bengal on 10 December 1971, ostensibly 
to evacuate the region of American citizens. According to Kissinger’s memoirs, the purpose of 
the task force was to dissuade Gandhi from launching a counterattack into West Pakistan.
312
 
 Although India decisively defeated Pakistan in the 1971 war, Nixon’s decision to send 
the USS Enterprise gave Gandhi the impression that a triumvirate of hostile powers, namely, the 
United States, China, and Pakistan were colluding against her nation. On 7 September 1972, she 
met with her new AEC chief, Homi Sethna, at the Trombay site and upon seeing a model of a 
proposed nuclear device, declared: "Get it ready. I will tell you whether to do it or not."
313
 This 
vague response marked the formal go-ahead to use the research conducted since 1967 to 
construct a nuclear explosive. Chengappa maintains that India had "made considerable progress 
on the bomb in those intervening years of 1967 to 1972." Similar to the Israeli case, the secrecy 
of India’s nuclear weapons program makes it difficult to determine precisely when construction 
of the bomb began. 
 In any case, the intelligence community was decidedly unsure if Gandhi had given her 
approval to move ahead with a nuclear test. The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research argued as early as 14 January 1972 that India could detonate a device over the "next 
several weeks" and that a "concerted by India to conceal such test preparations…might well 
succeed."
314
 After a flurry of conflicting reports from American embassies in India, Great 
Britain, and Canada, Kissinger requested the commissioning of a National Security Study 
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Memorandum (NSSM) on the implications of an Indian nuclear test.
315
 Kissinger attached a draft 
NSSM which considered the consequences of a test to include "increased interest and concern in 
the non-proliferation and test ban contexts," Soviet and Chinese attitudes toward South Asia, and 
questions concerning the quality of potential Indian weapons.. Nixon and his advisors were 
preparing to deal with the consequences of an Indian test instead of preventing a detonation. A 
new estimate from 7 August offered the remarkably vague conclusion that "to New Delhi, the 
arguments for and against conducting a test are strong" and "the chances are roughly even that 
India will conduct a test in the next several years and label it a peaceful explosion."
316
 Following 
the 18 May 1974 test, SNIE 31-72 was condemned in the intelligence community’s post-mortem 
as "far less bold" in its conclusions compared to earlier estimates.
317
 The post-mortem also 
openly admitted that "current intelligence publications did not provide any warning of India’s 
underground nuclear test." 
 Although faulty intelligence can be considered to have contributed to American inaction 
toward the Indian nuclear program, Nixon and Kissinger’s nonchalant approach to non-
proliferation raises the question whether "good" intelligence could have jarred them to take 
preventative measures. As Nixon’s non-response at the beginning of the chapter indicates, the 
Indian test was simply a new condition in the geopolitical landscape to be navigated, not a dire 
threat to global stability to be confronted directly. 
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 However, the Indian test had dire consequences for South Asia. It sparked a decades-long 
nuclear arms race with Pakistan, which led President Bill Clinton to describe South Asia as the 
"most dangerous place on earth" prior to his visit in January 2000.
318
 The detonation at Pokhran 
publicly marked the failure of previous non-proliferation efforts and, as Kissinger’s NSSM 
predicted, brought in increased pressures in the United States to develop a complete strategy to 
stem the tide of nuclear weapons. According to Chengappa, American officials at the ACDA, 
who could barely get the ears of senators with free lunches prior to the 1974 test, "found 
Congressmen rushing to them for advice and promising to bolster their cause."
319
 He even 
suggests that the test forced Kissinger to re-evaluate the perils of nuclear proliferation, as 
indicated by the warning offered to a Gandhi aide: "Don’t do it again. This time we will destroy 
you."
320
 The "Smiling Buddha" test, as it was later known, marked the end of the informal and 
contradictory American approach toward non-proliferation of the 1960s and 1970s. It also 
cemented the issue as a key interest of the United States in the minds of policymakers for 
subsequent decades.  
 The case of India's nuclear weapons program during the tenure of Kennedy, Johnson, and 
Nixon suggests that inaction, rather than uncoordinated nuclear policy, defined the American 
role in Pokhran test. The United States, along with other technologically advanced supplier 
nations, gave the Indian government access to the knowledge and technology for civilian 
purposes. After this technological base was established, India was capable of conduct weapons 
research in secret. Indian independence in nuclear affairs, combined with the mistaken American 
assumption that Gandhian opposition to the bomb was monolithic, led to a lower prioritization 
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by American policymakers. The failure to the threatened national interests behind weapons 
development resulted in India's rejection of multilateral agreements such as the NPT. The United 
States provided India both the means and leeway needed to build a nuclear explosive—
"peaceful" or not. 
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Conclusion: The Logic of American Non-Proliferation Initiatives 
Good nonproliferation policies make for bad politics. 
 
—Lyndon B. Johnson321 
 
 As discussed above, efforts to check the spread of nuclear arms in the 1960s and 1970s 
were disjointed and inconsistent. What Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon said in public at domestic 
and international venues was dramatically different to what their representatives whispered into 
the ears of Israeli and Indian officials. If a historian exclusively focuses on overt multilateral 
agreements on nuclear proliferation sought by presidents, as some have done, American efforts 
seem to have been a series of increasingly strict international restrictions on the civilian energy 
programs, albeit with debatable effectiveness.  However, analysis of declassified federal primary 
source material reveals a duality in the perceptions which guided American negotiations with 
Israel and India—the successful proliferators. The cases above reveal a number of factors that 
influenced the degree of duality in presidential decisions that produced the patchwork American 
record on non-proliferation in the 1960s and 1970s, as detailed below.  
 
Policymaker Attitudes toward the Nth Country Problem 
 
 There is no consensus among historians of non-proliferation  as to which American 
administration—Kennedy, Johnson, or Nixon—should be held "most responsible" for the spread 
of nuclear arms.  Gavin argued that John F. Kennedy "did little to halt proliferation" and Nixon 
"downgraded nonproliferation as a priority."
322
 Thomas C. Reed and Danny B. Stillman asserted 
that Kennedy "understood the dangers of nuclear proliferation," but his successor, Johnson, only 
cared about his "standing in the polls"  and dropped the issue to keep cash from "Israeli-linked 
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financiers" flowing.
323
 Bundy, who worked for both Kennedy and Johnson, argued that Nixon 
did not consider checking weapons development by non-nuclear countries "either feasible or 
highly important," as his predecessors had.
324
 
 Although the assessment of' "responsibility" for the spread of nuclear arms to Israel and 
India supposes an inaccurate degree of presidential agency in proliferation matters, as will be 
discussed below, there seems to be a clear difference in their attitudes toward the spread of the 
bomb. As Wohlstetter noted in his 1961 article on the proliferation issue, American 
policymakers had an clear answer to the question: "Is the spread of nuclear strike forces good or 
bad?"
325
 Kennedy and Johnson thought proliferation made the world a more dangerous place, 
which explains their efforts—bilateral and multilateral—to convince non-nuclear countries to 
disavow weapons development. They simply differed in terms of tactics, not ideals. Wohlstetter 
described a third group, one that thought there was "no point in deciding how we feel about the 
diffusion of nuclear capabilities," as the process was "inevitable."
326
 Richard Nixon's 
preconceptions of the proliferation problem  can be classified in this category. He considered the 
NPT at best a piece of paper he was expected to sign and at worse an unnecessary complication 
in relations with West Germany, Israel, and India. The acquisition of nuclear arms by a 
previously non-nuclear country was merely a new variable to be considered in international 
politics, not a dire threat. This attitude explains the collaboration of the Nixon administration 
with Israel's policy of nuclear opacity and its inattention toward India.  
 
The Role of Advisors—A Closed Discussion? 
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 Whatever their existing dispositions, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon did not make policy 
alone. Nuclear proliferation is both a technical and a political phenomenon. A range of American 
officials interpreted data, argued amongst themselves, proposed solutions, and acted on 
presidential decisions. When advisors shared the Commander-in-Chief's attitude toward non-
proliferation, they played a key role in the shaping of policy. There was strong disagreement 
between mid-level ACDA and State Department officials on the relative importance of halting 
additional weapons development in non-nuclear countries. However, the like-mindedness of their 
bosses, Foster and Rusk, saw non-proliferation become a policy priority in both the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations. The Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy duo clearly were not very 
concerned about the nth power problem. Neither gave the NPT more than cursory attention in 
their memoirs. No mention was made of the Indian test of 1974. Foster's successor at the ACDA, 
Gerald C. Smith, focused on the SALT talks with the Soviet Union instead of non-signatories of 
the NPT. Those advisors who held different attitudes from the President were by-and-large 
excluded from internal policy discussions, such as the Joint Chiefs under Kennedy and Johnson 
and most of the State Department under Nixon. 
 The important actors in the account above are limited to a handful of high-level Cabinet 
and independent agency officials. This is not to suggest that lower-level bureaucrats had no 
influence on non-proliferation policy. They certainly played a significant role by presenting the 
facts "on the ground" and their considered opinions to higher levels of government. However, the 
sensitivity and volatility of nuclear matters in the public sphere, as seen from the pre-Kennedy 
years up to the present day, ensured that the high-level officials having the greatest influence on 
policy were shielded by a veil of secrecy. This meant that the number of voices debating policy 
was limited—even to the point of misleading elected officials in Congress, as was the case in the 
[95] 
 
Ford administration. Many of the documents used in this study were declassified from "Secret" 
and "Top Secret" designations. Some—particularly those concerning Israel's weapons program—
are either missing from official archives or remain classified. For the purposes of historical 
study, the closed nature of non-proliferation policy discussions means that that the President's 
closest advisors had great influence on specific policy outcomes. Although Congress and public 
opinion certainly could place great pressure on a president to act in general, as was the case with 
Johnson in 1965, the element of secrecy precluded them from having significant influence on 
specific policy decision-making. 
 
Input: Intelligence Analysis and Non-Proliferation Policymaking 
 Presidents and their advisors had preexisting attitudes that influenced their decision, as 
discussed in the previous two sections. However, they were making decisions in the context of a 
dynamic world with rapidly changing conditions. Intelligence provided a picture of the world 
and sought to gauge the extent of the proliferation problem. The intelligence community did not 
provide accurate information to Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. The Indian explosion led the 
intelligence community to admit that they failed to convey a sense of urgency to their 
customers—the President and his advisors. Nixon's Director of Central Intelligence, William 
Colby, issued a memo shortly after the Smiling Buddha test directing all intelligence agencies to 
assess their performance.
327
 The resultant post-mortem found that the intelligence community 
had  no "sense of urgency" toward proliferation issues prior to the Indian detonation.
328
 This self-
admitted "failure" to provide accurate intelligence "denied the US Government the option of 
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considering diplomatic or other initiatives to prevent this significant step in nuclear 
proliferation."
329
 
 Bad intelligence also influenced American policy toward Israel's nuclear weapons 
program. The Dimona site was constructed in secret and accidentally discovered by a routine U-
2 flight. Policymakers were unaware that Israel likely had everything needed to conduct a 
nuclear strike in 1966 or 1967, which certainly raised the stakes of American policy during the 
Six-Days War. As noted above,  Nixon was probably surprised with a fait accompli when Golda 
Meir visited Washington in 1969. The intelligence community finally expressed their belief that 
Israel possessed atomic weaponry nearly eight years after the fact, in a 1974 estimate. 
 The picture of Israel and India's technical capacity for weapons development provided by 
the CIA and other agencies was less inaccurate than their analysis of political pressures favoring 
proliferation. The post-mortem correctly attributed the failure to accurately gauge nth country 
nuclear intentions in part to a dearth of human intelligence.
330
 When combined with questionable 
analysis of photographic (PHOTINT) and signals (SIGINT) evidence, policymakers mistakenly 
developed the impression that they had more time to formulate policy, as nth country weapons 
development proceeded apace.  
 
Tactical Considerations 
 Once a president developed an understanding of the situation in a particular non-nuclear 
country, he made a decision to act. As discussed above, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon dealt with 
nuclear proliferation very differently in both the international arena and bilateral relations with 
potential proliferators. 
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 Some of this difference in tactics can be attributed to the individual President's foreign 
policy style and inclinations. Kennedy, as seen in the Israeli case, favored personal 
communication and deal-making with foreign leaders like Ben-Gurion and Eshkol.  This choice 
of tactics is unsurprising given that he won executive office through knowing—and being born 
to—politically influential elites. His successor, Johnson made his career in the Senate, twisting 
arms and making compromises to reach consensus in legislation. As President, Johnson sought 
agreement with non-nuclear countries on international safeguards and regulations. In bilateral 
relations with Israel and India, Johnson used American political clout to (unsuccessfully) 
encourage acceptance of the NPT. Nixon distrusted the established bureaucracy—the "Ivy-
Leaguers" at the CIA, the military which dominated policy under Johnson, and  what he called 
those "impossible fags" at the State Department.
331
 He and Kissinger conducted many secret 
bilateral deals and eschewed adherence to existing multilateral agreements like the NPT. 
 However, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon did not choose tactics in a vacuum. In many 
respects, their choice of tactics (or absence of tactics, in Nixon's case) in checking proliferation 
was determined in part by the difficulties of their predecessors. As a candidate, Kennedy 
lambasted Nixon in the 1960 campaign for the Eisenhower administration's inaction on the 
proliferation issue and was the first President to address it in policy. Although Kennedy's 
assassination ended a high-level dialogue with Israeli leaders on the topic of arms control, 
relations were strained while he was still alive over inspections of the Dimona site. Johnson 
sought to bypass these difficulties by changing the venue of non-proliferation talks to the UN 
and the ENDC in Geneva. Nixon saw how non-proliferation talks restricted his Democratic 
predecessors' freedom to conduct diplomacy with allies such as Israel and West Germany and 
                                                 
331
 Quoted in Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 197. This is very 
clear in the previously-mentioned National Security Decision Memorandum 6 to ratify the NPT, in which the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and the CIA were merely CCed. 
[98] 
 
important non-aligned states like India. As such, he paid lip service to the ideal of non-
proliferation while secretly lowering its importance in his foreign policy.  
 
Success, Failure, and Agency 
 In 1961 Wohlstetter described three sets of scholarly opinions on the spread of nuclear 
weapons: those who considered it "good," those who considered it "bad," and those who 
considered it "inevitable." Although the theoretical assumptions behind most previous historical 
writing on non-proliferation fall solidly within the "pessimist" category, such discussions are 
better suited for social scientists.  
 For historians of non-proliferation, there is a parallel dyad of assumptions when 
analyzing policy during the second wave of nuclear weapons development. The first  is that 
Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon all possessed a great deal of agency over the development of 
nuclear weapons by previously non-nuclear states. If this assumption is accepted, as it is by 
previous histories, then it is possible to assign responsibility and to state that a particular 
President "successfully" or "unsuccessfully" confronted the spread of nuclear weapons. 
 However, the narrative presented above reveals this assumption to be both overly 
simplistic and unfair. Between 1961 and 1974, all three administrations discovered that it was 
very difficult to compel politically significant allied and neutral states with established civilian 
nuclear programs to voluntarily halt weapons development. Both Israel and India acquired a 
significant amount of nuclear equipment, material, and know-how from Western firms and 
governments prior to 1961. Their leaders actively sought to conceal weapons development 
programs from the American government. There were significant constraints on what Kennedy, 
Johnson, and Nixon could do, let alone choose to do. 
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 However, the assertion that policymakers had much outside of their control in 
proliferation matters  does not deny them agency.  Kennedy chose to allow hundreds of Indian 
scientists to continue their study at American nuclear facilities. Johnson chose to drop the issue 
of Dimona inspections with Eshkol. Nixon chose to not push the ratification of the NPT. This 
assumption is simply based on the fact that the clock on weapons development did not reset with 
the arrival of a new President in the Oval Office. 
 
 During the 1960s and the early 1970s, American non-proliferation efforts were 
inconsistent and often self-defeating—even within particular administrations. This unique 
fragmentation is due to the influences of presidential outlook, individual advisors, and  
intelligence analysis on policy decision-making, as well as the tactical choices made by 
Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. This inconsistency gave India and Israel the time needed to drag 
out negotiations with American policymakers and develop nuclear weapons. 
 After the "failures" of the second phase of nuclear proliferation, American officials 
placed greater emphasis on creating an effective regime of international safeguards and 
regulations. However, the consequences of Indian and Israeli weapons development are to be 
found in the nuclear programs of Pakistan, Libya, Iraq, and Iran. The future of non-proliferation 
is indeed directly linked to its past. 
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Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate March 13, 1969 
Ratified by U.S. President November 24, 1969 
U.S. ratification deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow March 5, 1970 
Proclaimed by U.S. President March 5, 1970 
Entered into force March 5, 1970 
 
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty", 
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the 
consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to 
safeguard the security of peoples, 
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of 
nuclear war, 
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the 
conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, 
Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency 
safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities, 
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, 
within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the 
principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use 
of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points, 
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, 
including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from 
the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all 
Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear weapon States, 
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate 
in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in 
cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes, 
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms 
race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, 
                                                 
332
 Cited in Williams and Cantelon, eds., The American Atom, 254-260. 
[107] 
 
Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective, 
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon 
tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the 
discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations 
to this end, 
Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between 
States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation 
of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and 
the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under 
strict and effective international control, 
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be 
promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the worlds human and economic resources, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or 
explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any 
non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. 
Article II 
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from 
any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control 
over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise 
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any 
assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
Article III 
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set 
forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the 
Agencys safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its 
obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy 
from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the 
safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable 
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material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is 
outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or 
special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, 
under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. 
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable 
material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or 
production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful 
purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards 
required by this article. 
3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply 
with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological 
development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, 
including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or 
production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this 
article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty. 
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually 
or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry 
into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after 
the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of 
such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date 
of initiation of negotiations. 
Article IV 
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to 
the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty. 
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the 
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information 
for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also 
cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the 
further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the 
territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs 
of the developing areas of the world. 
Article V 
Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance 
with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate 
international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions 
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will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory 
basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible 
and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the 
Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or 
agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-
nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the 
Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also 
obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements. 
Article VI 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control. 
Article VII 
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in 
order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. 
Article VIII 
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed 
amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all 
Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the 
Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the 
Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment. 
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to 
the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other 
Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party 
that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments 
of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all 
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment 
is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument 
of ratification of the amendment. 
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall 
be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to 
assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At 
intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting 
a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences 
with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty. 
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Article IX 
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty 
before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any 
time. 
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and 
instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of 
America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which 
are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the 
deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon 
State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive 
device prior to January 1, 1967. 
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry 
into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of 
ratification or accession. 
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the 
date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the 
date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a 
conference or other notices. 
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
Article X 
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the 
Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have 
jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all 
other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. 
Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized 
its supreme interests. 
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to 
decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an 
additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the 
Treaty. 
Article XI 
[111] 
 
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally 
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified 
copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of 
the signatory and acceding States. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. 
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of July one 
thousand nine hundred sixty-eight. 
 
